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The JOURNAL consistently aims to print matter which presents a view of merit
on a subject deserving attention. Beyond this no collective responsibility Is assumed
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CONTRmUoRS OF LEADING ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE
ARTHUR L. CORBIN is a Professor of Law, Yale University.
STUART S. BALL is a member of the Illinois and Iowa bars.
B. H. HARTOGENSIS is a member of the Maryland bar. He was editor of'
the Baltimore American from 1890-1896.
FRANCIS B. SAYRE is a Professor of Law, Harvard University.
In the death of Richard Martin Paskus the Journal has lost an.
editor, and the members of the Board a close friend. We who.
came to know him were even more deeply impressed by the quiet.
sincerity of his personality than by the clear insight and honesty
so characteristic of his work. The full measure of his contribu-
tion to the Journal those who did not know will never realize.
It is with deep regret that the Journal prints the following-
Comment as his final contribution.
THE "ILLEGAL" CREATION OF SHARES IN RETURN FOR NOTES'
Many state constitutions contain the following clause: "No.
corporation shall issue stock or bonds except for money paid,.
ljbor done or property actually received, and all fictitious in-
* The general subject matter of this comment has already been treated.
in an article particularly notable for a careful discussion of the Texas
authorities. Waterman, The Creation of Corporate Shares in Return for-
Promissory Notes (1929) 7 TEX. L. REv. 215.
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-crease of stock or indebtedness shall be void!" 'When a cor-
-poration, in return for a note, attempts to create as to an indi-
-vidual some or all of the interests constituting that amorphous
status, shareholdership, the interpretation of such a provision
presents a difficult problem.
Whether the provision has any application to a spedific case
-depends at least upon the answers to the questions: does the
-ransaction amount to an "issue of stock," and is the note "money
paid" or "property"? The latter question may be affected by
-various circumstances, e. g., the presence of security for the note,
the solvency of the maker, payment of the note, or the fact that
-the corporation has discounted the note with or without recourse.
The problem of whether the provision applies and, if so, what
is to be its effect, arises under varied circumstances. Thus the
-corporation may bring two types of actions, and either may be
affected by whether the litigation is controlled by the directors
.or by non-assenting shareholders. These actions may be to en-
force payment of the note, or to cancel the shares in suits against
either the original takers or bona fide transferees for value, with
or without tender of the note in court, and before or after the
note has been paid or payment tendered. Non-assenting share-
holders or creditors may seek to enjoin the issue, or to recover
-damages from the directors for losses resulting from their "il-
legal" act. The original holder of the shares may bring the fol-
lowing suits, before or after he has paid the note or tendered cash
to the corporation: he may seek to cancel the note in a suit
:against the corporation, creditors of the corporation, or holders
in due course, and at the time of suit he may or may not tender
the certificates into court for cancellation, and he may or may
not be in a position to surrender them; he ma: on the other hand
sue the directors or non-assenting shareholders to secure recog-
nition of his interests in the corporation, and at the time of suit
'ALA. CoNsT. § 234;, Amz. CONST. XIV, § 6; ALL CoNsT. XII, § 8;
CAL. CONST. XII, § 11; CoLO. CoNsT. XV, § 9; DEr. CoNsr. IX, § 3; IDARo
CONST. XI, § 9; KY. CONST. § 193; LA. CONST. art. 266; DIo. CONST. XII,
§ 8; AToN. CONST. XV, § 10; N. D. CosT. § 138; OELA. CONST. IX, § 39;
PA. CONST. XVI, § 7; S. C. CONSr. IX, § 10; S. D. CoNsT. XVII, § 8;
TEx. CoNST. XII, § 6; UTAn CoNsT. XII, § 5; WAsE. CONSr. XII, § 6.
It is believed that the cited provisions are sufficiently similar to justify
comparison of cases decided under them. In addition, comparison is made
with cases decided under similar statutes, or statutes similar at least in
that they have been held to prohibit the issue of shares for notes. For a
discussion of the problems arising under similar requirements imposed by
a Blue Sky Commission, see Comment (1930) 18 CALir. L. REV. 149. De-
cisions under such provisions are for the most part analogous as to the
parties protected and the difficulties of enforcement, but a provision less
rigorous in its requirements, such as one requiring only a 10Lo cash pay-
ment, might well be more strictly enforced than one requiring payment of
a larger percentage. But of. Furlong v. Johnston, infra notes 10 and 11.
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the corporation may or may not have discounted his note. The
holder in due course may sue the maker oil his note, or the cor-
poration on its indorsement. A bona fide transferee of the shares
may sue the corporation, represented either by the directors or
the non-assenting shareholders, to compel his recognition as a
shareholder, or for damages, and he may also sue his transferor
or the directors for damages. Creditors of the corporation may
sue the maker on the note, or the present holders of the shares
on the theory that they are not full-paid. It is not here in-
tended to make an exhaustive list of the various ways in which
the issue may be presented, but it is apparent that the mere
wording of the provision quoted furnishes no definition of the
transactions to which it was intended to apply and no clue as to
what effect it should be given when applicable.3
A determination of persons intended to be protected and the
risks against which they were to be guarded might be expected
to furnish a suggestion of the result which should be reached.
There are "at least five groups whose interests might be served
by requiring payment for shares to be made in cash rather than
in some medium less liquid, secure, or fungible. These are: (1)
those already shareholders in the corporation, to whose interest
it is that the corporation obtain as much as possible for shares
subsequently created; (2) those who may subsequently invest in
shares relying upon the fact that shares listed as full-paid repre-
sent more than a possibility of the collection of their par value,
or upon the fact that certificates so issued are not open to sub-
sequent attack; (3) those who may extend credit relying upon
the paid-in value of the shares; (4) creditors who became such
prior to the creation of the shares in question and who are in-
terested, as is the" first group, in the successful management of
the corporation; and (5) a group which has an interest in check-
ing wild-cat enterprises by requiring that a corporation start
business with some liquid capital or similar assets of determin-
able value which will assure to some extent its solvency and
prosperity. Under modern conditions of interrelated economic
organization the last group comprises the whole community.
But even if it be recognized that a particular transaction is
one which contains unreasonable possibilities of harm to each of
the above classes, it still is normally impossible for a court to
handle the issues presented in a suit involving a transaction al-
ready executed without injuring one or more of those classes.
2 A circumstance which might influence decisions but which apparently
is not raised in the cases is whether the note is a demand. or time note,
and if a time note whether it extends beyond the period to which statutes
sometimes limit unpaid subscriptions. Cf. Tnx. ComP. STAT. (1928). arts.
1331, 1338.
3 For a discussion of the lack of definite meaning of "void" as used
in statutes, see Comment (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 362.
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Consider, for example, the most common type of such suit. A
corporation through its directors sues the maker on notes given
.n return for the creation of shares, in a jurisdiction whose con-
stitation has been interpreted to prohibit the specific transaction.
The maker defends on the ground that the transaction was illegal
and that the notes are wanting in consideration, i. e., that the
"
4void" shares cAnnot be considered sufficient consideration. If
the court enforces payment of the notes, the interests of those
who are at present creditors or shareholders of the corporation
will be protected so far as the particular transaction is concerned,
as the maker of the note will not be allowed to avoid his obligation
at their expense. On the other hand, the protection designed for"
future shareholders, creditors, and the general public will be re-
moved, for if corporations can obtain the aid of the courts in col-
lecting such notes, they will accept them for shares when it is
impossible to get cash. It is not likely that the little used remedy
of quo wa-ranto will prove a great deterrent. Furthermore,
should the corporation continue to take such risks in the future,
inju7 may result even to the interests of those who are benefited
by the immediate outcome of the suit. If recovery on the notes
is denied, and the maker then asks for their cancellation, the court
must further determine what affirmative relief it will grant a
"guilty" party. To deny cancellation of the notes may leave it
within the power of the corporation to collect the amount due by
.negotiating the notes to a holder in due course and creating as to
him rights against the maker. Would such a result be desirable
if the shares have been cancelled, or if in fact the directors were
the only parties who realized the illegality of the original trans-
action?
It seems apparent that there are great difficulties in the way of
an adequate solution of any one of the many problems here in-
volved. Furthermore, the decision in every such case affects and
is affected by the decisions in all the other suits to which the con-
stitutional provision may be applied.4 As a matter of fact the
courts have generally protected the parties involved who had
the least possibility of controlling the original transaction, i. e.,
holders in due course, bona fide transferees, and creditors.5 These
4It is obvious that in the simple case of the corporation suing the
maker to enforce the note, a relevant inquiry is -whether the shares created
are subject to attack by the attorney-general, or in suits brought for the
corporation by directors or non-assenting shareholders; whether the shares
can be transferred so as to create in the transferee rights against the
corporation; whether a holder in due course can collect the note; and
whether the maker by payment or tender of payment can create in him-
self the rights of a shareholder. Among the most cogent reasons for
more detailed legislation on this subject is the fact that a, court in decid-
ing the specific problem before it might easily fail to see all of the
multitude of situations affected.
See infra. note 39.
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decisions may be justified on grounds of fairness, or of the in-
effectiveness of rendering prophylactic decisions against parties
who are mere bystanders in the improper transaction. Yet the
recognition of the rights of innocent parties necessarily dimin-
ishes the prohibitive effect of the provision, since each "guilty"
party, although unable directly to receive that for which he bar-
gained, can always benefit from the agreement indirectly, through
his power, by transferring the instrument, to render it enforce-
able according to its tenor.,
In discussing the application of the constitutional provision and
statutes in question, this comment will proceed in an order pos-
sibly more arbitrary than realistic. Those cases will first be dis-
cussed in which the question was raised of whether the provision
applied at all; then those in which the court, having determined
that the transaction was prohibited, was presented with the prob-
lem of enforcing the agreement according to its terms; and finally
cases in which the courts were asked by the parties involved in an
admittedly prohibited transaction for relief from certain liabili-
ties arising therefrom.7
Is a note considered proper consideration for the "issue of
shares" under a statute requiring "money paid" or "property"?
It can at least be said that notes are not money, though they
may be its equivalent, and that they are not necessarily "prop-
erty," although statutory definitions of property not referring
specifically to the provision here in question may include choses in
6 There is sometimes an interesting discrepancy between the protection
afforded the corporation as a whole and that extended to the innocent
shareholders acting on behalf of the corporation. Compare the holdings in
the suits against the makers of the notes in Bank of Commerce v. Goolsby,
129 Ark. 416, 196 S. W. 803 (1917), with those in Bank of Dermott v.
Measel, 172 Ark, 193, 287 S. W. 1017 (1926) and Bank of Manila v.
Wallace, 177 Ark. 190, 5 S. W. (2d) 937 (1928). Since the ultimate
recovery in either type of action goes to the corporation, and thus to, the
guilty as well as to the innocent, to those who did not rely and those who
did, is the distinction valuable? Was it consciously drawn? See Bank of
Dermott v. Measel, supra at 196, 287 S. W. at 1018. A holding support-
ing the distinction is Pine River Bank v. Hodsdon, 46 N. H. 114 (1865).
One way of achieving the distinction is by applying the doctrine of estoppel
to bat suits by the original parties, who are presumed to know the law,
or by anyone else who knew the facts, and permitting those without knowl-
edge to bring such suits. See Ransome Concrete Machinery Co. v. Moody,.
282 Fed. 29, 34 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922).
7Many of the eases may have been decided on either of two issues) and.
it is sometimes difficult to determine which was the real basis of the-
decision. Thus in Meholin v. Carlson, 17 Idaho 742, 107 Pac. 755 (1910),
some of the justices placed their decision on the ground that a note was'
property, and others on the ground that the suit was by a receiver. Where
decisions may have been based on either of two issues this comment tries
to avoid citing the case as a direct holding on either point, unless it is.
expressly stated by the court to be such. Cf. General Bonding & Casualty*
Ins. Co. v. Moseley, infra note 18.
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action.8 This provision was designed to prevent the corporation
from assuming the risk of never receiving par value for shares
created or certificates issued. From the viewpoint of risk as-
sumed, a note becomes the equivalent of "money paid" only after
it has been paid or payment has been tendered," or after it has
been negotiated by the corporation without recourse at its face-
value. Accordingly, the courts tend to consider such notes valid
consideration for shares after the corporation has received pay-
ment, even if not before.10 Some courts have gone further and
considered all notes which could be discounted the equivalent
of cash payment at the moment when the corporation received
cash, although the corporation, being secondarily responsible on
the note because of its endorsement, still bore the risk of the
maker's insolvency." Such decisions can be justified only on the
ground that the courts believed the question at issue to be, not
whether the corporation was forced to run certain risks, but
8 See Waterman, op. cit. supra star note, at 217, for opinions stated in
such terms. It seems doubtful to the writer that any court, whatever its
language, would feel that such definitions7 were controlling. See Cahall v.
Lofland, infra note 41, at 317, 114 At. at 233.
9 But of. Lee v. Cameron, 67 Oda. 80, 169 Pac. 17 (1917) ; Waterman,
op. cit. upre star note, at 231. Are the questions of the creation of shares
for notes of a face value eqtial to par, and of the creation for some other
consideration of a character perminted by statute but of a value less
than par under a statute requiring payment of the par value, sufficiently
analogous to, make comparison valuable?
10 Furlong v. Johnston, 239 N. Y. 141, 145 N. E. 910 (1924) (suit on
note by holder with notice); Ramsay v. Crevlin, 254 Fed. 813 (C. C. A-
8th, 1918) (same); Conover v. Hasselman, 206 Iowa 100, 220 N. W. 42
(1928) (same); see Whitewater T. & P. Mfg. Co. v. Baker, 142 Wis. 420,
423, 125 N. W. 984, 986 (1910); Mills v. Friedman, 111 Mise. 253, 270,
181 N. Y. Supp. 235, 295 (Sup., Ct. 1920).; of. Haynes v. Kenosha Elm.
R. R., 139 Wis. 227, 119 N. W. 568 (1909) (bonds).
"First Nat'l Bank v. Fulton, 156 Iowa 734, 137 N. W. 1019 (1912)
(suit on note by holder with notice). In Conover v. Hasselman, -upra
note 10, the court apparently, reasons that the defendant must pay his
note because he becdme a shareholder; that he became a shareholder be-
cause the mode of payment was satisfactory; that the mode of payment
was satisfactory because the indorsement of the corporation was of no
significance; and that the indorsement was of no importance because the
note is now being collected as against the maker. The decision in Furlong
v. Johnston, mupra note 10, was rendered after the repeal of the statute
in question, when, since precedent as to future issues was not involved,
the only question left was whether the "guilty" shareholder should be al-
lowed to avoid his obligation. Contrast the decision in Re Waterloo
Organ Co., 134 Fed. 341 (C. C. A. 2d, 1904). See Comment (1925) 10 ConN.
L. Q. 504, 506, approving the logic of the Furlong case. A further diffi-
culty may arise under such holdings if, as in the Furlong case and Lone
Tree Bank v. Timmerman, 193 Iowa 1320, 188 N. W. 856 (1922), the
corporation discounts the note at less than par, thus putting it out of its
power to secure full payment for the shares created, although the maker
may later be forced to pay a holder the face value: of the note.
1930]
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whether the corporation, even if actually borrowing in part on its
own credit, did receive the required cash.22
Another circumstance under which it has been said that a note
is "money paid" or "property" is where the note is due and col-
lectible at the time suit is brought.23 It is somewhat ridiculous
to suppose that legislators would go to the trouble of specifically
making bad notes unenforceable, or giving corporations the
power to withdraw benefits conferred without consideration. The
value of the provision, if it is intended to prevent the assump-
tion of risks, is completely destroyed by a test which is gen-
erally based on circumstances arising only after the risk has
been irretrievably assumed, since such a test furnishes no definite
guide by which the officers or directors may determine, at the
time of the proposed creation of the shares, whether the trans-
action will be in violation of the legislative prohibition. 4
It is probably futile to discuss in the abstract whether notes
are "property." Far more important is the question how far
taking notes represents a greater risk than the corporation is
permitted to assume under 9: provision making "property" valid
consideration. The difference between notes received for shares
and other types of property similarly acquired by a corporatioh is
that any corporation in order to do business must take certain
chances with respect to the type of property in which it is dealing,
be it patents or mining claims, but most corporations are not nec-
essarily. forced to assume extensive banking risks by using
promises to pay as basic capital. Notes may be of a less speculative
value than patents, and yet the directors may be far less compe-
tent to deal with these lesser risks. Property to be used in the
business must be purchased at some time and the risk of its value
assumed, but it is hardly the function of every corporation to ex-
tend credit to its shareholders. In the case of banks and insurance
companies, the very corporations most expert in dealing with
such risks, the interest of the community in the stability of such
enterprises is even more strongly opposed to the creation of a
capital structure based upon promissory notes.1
The decisions reflect the uncertainty inherent in the legislative
vagueness of language and purpose. Some courts allow shares
to be created for unsecured notes, or at least for good unsecured
notes.", Other courts deny the right to take unsecured notes,17
12 But see Waterman, op. cit. supra star note, at 226.
2 3First Nat'l Bank v. Fulton, supra note 11.
14 See dissent in Schiller Piano Co. v. Hyde, 39 S. D. 74, 81, 162 N. W.
937, 939 1(1917).
11 -Cf. Prudential Life Ins. Co. v. Pearson, 188 S. W. 513 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1916), rev'd, 222 S. W. 967 (Tex. Comm. App. 1920).
a6 Schiller Piano Co. v. Hyde, 39 S. D. 74, 162 N. W. 937 (191?) (suit
on note by corporation); German Mercantile Co. v. Wanner, 26 N. D. 479,
142 N. W. 463 (1913), 52 L. R. A. (N. s.) 453 (1914) (same); Goodrich v.
[Vol. 39
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but allow corporations to take notes sufficiently secured.& 1 The
difference between a secured and an unsecured note is, of course,
not that one i. "property" while the other is not, but that one
will require the corporation to take fewer risks, since the col-
lateral may have a definite market value, and in any case is
security additional to the note. Only one couft has been found
which now holds that an adequately secured note may not be
the required "property." 10 A note so secured is "property"
for the purpose of placing resources in the hands of the
corporation, but it may be pointed out that if the collateral
were so good, the shareholder might have borrowed against it,
paying the corporation in cash. The courts are forced, of course,
to compromise between the desire for security and an equal
desire to permit a flexible market for certain shares2
A further problem is the formulation of a satisfactory defini-
tion of "issue of shares.!'2 The constitutional provision can not
definitely be said to prohibit all contracts to create shares if en-
tirely executory.2- How can such contracts of "subscription" be
distinguished from the prohibited "issue of shares"? It is im-
probable that there is any one incident which distinguishes all
shareholders from all subscribers. Some courts, such as Texas,
have attempted to draw a distinction between the two which has
not always been insisted upon even by the legislators23 In
Reynolds, 31 IUL 490 (1863) (suit on note by holder with notice under
statute requiring 10% payment in cash); Pacific Trust Co. v. Dorsey, 72
Cal. 55, 12 Pac. 49 (1887) (suit on note by corporation under statute re-
quiring 10% payment, and forbidding banks to include promissory notes
in statements of paid in capital); of. Meholin v. Carlson, supra note 'T.
27 Kanaman v. Gahagan, 111 Tex. 170, 230 S. W. 141 (1921) (suit on
note by promoter); Jones Drug Co. v. Williams, 139 Miss. 170, 103 So. 810
(1925) (suit on note by holder with notice); AlSbama Nat'l Bank v. Hal-
sey, 109 Ala. 196 (1895) (same); Southwestern Tank Co. v. Morrow, 115
Okla. 97, 241 Pac. 1097 (1925) (suit on note by corporation); Bank of
*Dermott v. Measel, supra note 6 (same); (1926) 10 MINN. L. REV. 536.
's8 General Bonding & Casualty Ins. :Co. v. Moseley, 110 Tex. 529, 222
S. W. 961 (1920), rev'g 174 S. W. 1031 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915), and over-
ruling previous Texas decisions. See Comment (1923) 1 TEX. L. REnv. 306.
Contra: Wa]z v. Oser, 93 N. J. Eq. 280, 116 AtI. 16 (1922) (weakened
as authority by extreme facts and statute, 2 N. J. COMP." STAT. (1911)
1630); of. Sohland v. Baker, 141 Ati. 277 (Del. 1927).1 1
'Wa]z v. Oser, supre note 18. See North Dakota statute, cited infra
note 45.
20 Such issue may be necessary if mew enterprises are to be supported in
a 1rontier community. See Clark v. Farrington, 11 Wis. 306, 319 (1860).
21 See Waterman, op. cit. suipra star note, at 240.
22It has been suggested that in certain states a consistent interpretation
of the constitution might require that decisions affecting-'the creation of
shares be applied to agreements of "subscription" and payments by install-
meits. Waterman op. cit. supra star note, at 239.
23A3jjs 1335 and 1339 of Tm. ConP. STAT. (1928) apparently use
"subscriber" and 'stockholder" interchangeably. For a similar confusion
1930] 7 13
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determining whether or not a given transaction is legal, the sig-
nificant factors seem to be the rights recognized by the corpora-
tion in the holder. There apparently is no doubt ihat if a cor-
poration may accept a subscription, it may accept its rights under
such a subscription in negotiable form.2 4 It is impossible to state
with accuracy what rights the corporation may not confer upon
a "subscriber" without "issuing shares" to him within the mean-
ing of the statute and thus outlawing the transaction. For ex-
ample, "subscribers" have been allowed to vote, and share in
dividends.5 The element carrdng most weight at present in
Texas seems to be the issue of the certificate.0 Such a line
seems rather unfortunate, since it is neither mechanically easy to
draw,27 nor technically valid.2 8 Interpreting the Texas law of
see German Mercantile Co. v. Wanner, supra note 16, at 482, 142 N. W.
at 464.
24 It was so held in the following suits on the notes by the corporation
or holders with notice: Cope v. Pitzer, 166 S. W. 447 (Tex. Civ. App.
1914).; Horn Bros. v. Baker, 173 S. W. 474 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914); Com-
monwealth Bonding & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hollifleld, 220 S. W. 322 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1920), Tev'g 184 S. W. 776 (Tex. Civ. App. 1016); Comnmon-
wealth Bonding & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hill, 184 S. W. 247 (Tex. Civ. App.
1916) ; McCoy v. Bankers' Trust Co., 200 S. W. 1138 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918) ;
Smith v. McAdams, 206 S. W. 955 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918).
2 5 Cf. Cope v. Pitzer, supra note 24 (dividends payable to "subscriber") ;
Mitchell v. Porter, 223 S. W. 197 (Tex. Comm. App. 1920) ("subscriber"
given vote); Davis v. Mitchell, 225 S. W. 1117 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920)
(same). See German Mercantile Co. v. Wanner, &pra note 16, at 489,
142 N. W. at 467; dissent of Huff, C. J., in Cattlemen's Trust v. Swear-
ingen, infia note 26, at 602.
20 Cf. Kanaman v. Gahagan, supra note 17; Cattlemen's Trust Co. v.
Swearingen, 200 S. W. 596 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918); McCoy v. Bankers'
Trust Co.; Commonwealth Bonding & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hill; Horn Bros. v.
Baker; Smith v. McAdams, all supra note 24. See Watermian, op. cit. supra
star note, at 220 et seq.
27 The question becomes complicated when the corporation, though "issu-
ing" the certificate, retains some control over it till the note is paid.
That the line is indistinct may be seen by comparing Commonwealth Bond-
ing & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hill, upra note 24, with Cattlemen's Trust Co. v.
Swearingen, supra note 26; and Kanaman v. Gahagan, supra note 17,
with Farmers' and Merchants' State Bank v. Falvey, 175 S. W. 833 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1915). In General Bonding & Casualty Co. v. Moseley, supra
note 18, it was apparently conceded that the transaction amounted to an
"issue of shares," yet it seems doubtful how far the facts differ from those
in Kanaman v. Gahagan, supra note 17.
28 It has been said that the right to a certificate ir not a conclusive jn-
cident of shareholdership. BALLANTINu, PnrvAi' CORPORATIONS (1927)
415. The distinction which the Texas court has made has received the
approval of the UNIwo R BusiEss CORPORATION AcT § 16 and of Water-
man, op. cit. supra star note, at 240, but possibly chiefly on the ground
tHat publicity of accounts is of far more importance than the protection
of the paid in value of shares. The Texas court might not accept this
assumption. It has been, suggested that those who before incorporation
agree to become shareholders are "subscribers." and that those later con-
[Vol. so
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corporations as a body, it is apparent that it requires at least
50% of the authorized shares to be paid for in full before the
corporation files its articles of association, and the remainder to
be subscribed and paid for within two years.- It might well be
necessary to insist only that the corporation include no shares
in the 50% paid-up for which it has in fact received only notes.
Since subscriptions of some sorts are allowed for the remaining
50%, it should make comparatively little difference what rights
the corporation recognizes in these subscribers if the nature of
the transaction is apparent on the books. Quibbling about; the
issue of certificates to subscribers for the last 50% may result
in a great deal of trouble in securing subscribers and collect-
ing subscriptions, without protecting the creditors of the cor-
poration, those who may extend credit, shareholders, or persons
who may later purchase shares. While such a system of regu-
lation would be unprecedented in Texas, and would require a
change in the interpretation of the constitution, it is an inter-
pretation very similar to that which has been made in Cali-
fornia,30 and the Texas court has already proved itself willing to
reverse its interpretation.1
The effect of drawing a distinction between "shareholders"
and "subscribers" in this respect is that in suits between the
parties each is put in the position either of basing a right of
.action upon the fact that benefits have been received from the
other party, or of repudiating an accepted agreement. 2 Thus,
in a suit to cancel shares issued for notes the corporation alleges
that it has always treated this individual as. a shareholder, and
that since the statute prohibits the creation .of shares for such
consideration, the corporation is not merely privileged, but also
under a duty, no longer to recognize him as a shareholder. The
maker, on the other hand, when he sues to recover his notes,
alleges that he has received from the corporation contrary to
statutory prohibitions, various benefits belonging only to share-
holders such as voting rights, dividends, or a certificate, and that
the entire transaction being: therefore tainted with "illegality,"
his note is without consideration and therefore unenforceable.
The defenses are equally paradoxical, since the corporation de-
fends on the suit to recover the note by alleging that it has really
extended few and tenuous rights, and the maker of the note, in
a suit by the corporation to cancel the shares, defends on the
tracting to "1 urchase" shares should be considered "shareholders.' See
Guaranty Mtge Co. v. WRcox, 62 Utah 184, 192, 218 Pac. 133, 136 (1923).
29 TE. ComP. STAT. (1928) arts. 1308, 1331, 1338.
W See Comment (1930) 18 CALiF. L. hay. 149.
n Washer v. Smyer, 109 Tex. 398, 211 S. W. 985, 4 A. L. R. 1320 (1919);
General Bonding & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Moseley, supra note 18.32 See cases cited supra notes 24, 25, 26, 27 for the pleading problems
described in this paragraph.
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ground that the transaction has really yielded him nothing sub-
stantial. In a suit on the note, the maker defends by alleging
that he has received the incidents of shareholdership, and in a
suit to compel recognition of the shares the corporation alleges
in defense that since the plaintiff has always been treated as a
shareholder, he has no right to remain one. The illogical results
of such pleadings drive courts to expressions of distaste,33 and
to a use of the doctrine of estoppel against whichever party they
deem more culpable.34
One possible solution to this difficulty is a decision that the
corporation can disregard the note and sue on the subscription."
Expedient as this might be if the court haa little belief in the
necessity of enforcing the constitutional provision, it is open to
a logical objection in that, if the contract was one of subscription
merely, the suit could be maintained on the note, but if the con-
tract was for the immediate creation of shares, there is no con-
tract of subscription, but merely an illegal transaction which it
is beyond the power of the corporation to perform or to enforce.30
When a court has) decided that a given transaction is an at-
tempt at'the prohibited creation of shares for neither money re-
ceived nor property, what will be the effect of such a decision
when the problem is raised in the various ways indicated above?
A few cases have held that the word "void" as used by the con-
stitution forced a decision that no action could be brought by
the holder in due course of the note against the makers.37  De-
cisions of this type penalizing the helpless creditors, bona fide
transferees, and holders in due course have not been generally
approved, and have in some cases been overruled.88 The trend of
33 See Goodrich v. Reynolds, supra note 16, at 496.
34The doctrine of estoppel was invoked in the following cases: Schiller
Piano Co. v. Hyde, supra note 14; Joy v. Godchaux, 35 F. (2d) 649 (C.
C. A. 8th,. 1929).;. Davis v. Mitchell, supra note 25; Thompson v. First
State Bank, 109 Tex. 419, 211 S. W. 977 (1919); Goodrich v. Reynolds,
supra note 16; McCallum v. Wing, 30 F. (2d) 305 (C. C. A. lst, 1929),;
Central Co. v. Mulroney, 196 Iowa 38, 194 N. W. 295 (1923). In the in-.
dividual cases the use of this metho, of carrying out the court's sense of
justice may be justified, but a court's ethical standards furnish little basis
for prediction.35Boldt v. Motor Securities Co., 74 Colo. 55, 218 Pac. 748 (1923); see
Mitchell v. Porter, 223 S. W. 197, 201 (Tex. Comm. App. 1920); Washer
v. Smyer, supra note 31, ald 409, 211 S. W. at 989.
36Baird v. Kilene, 53 N. D. 244, 205 N. W. 681 (1925). But see Water-
man, op. cit. supra star note, at 221. Could the corporation disregard the
note and sue on the subscription if the note were not yet payable? See
German.Mercantile Co. v. Wanner, supra note 16, at 484, 142 N. W. at 465.
-7Republic Trust Co. v. Taylor, 184 S. W. 772 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916);
Prudential Life Ins, Co. v. Smyer, 183 S. W. 825 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).;
Ater v. Rotan Grocery Co., 189. S. W. 1106 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916); see
Lake St. El. R. R. Co. v. Ziegler, 99 Fed. 114, 128 (C. C. A. Ith, 1900).3SWasher v. Smyer, supra note 31.
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the modern decisions is toward recognition of the invalidity of
the transaction as a bar only to actions brought by the original
parties or holders with notice.P The effect of such decisions, of
course, is to render it easier for the "guilty" parties to carry out
the transactions by selling the instruments exchanged. It is this
result against which the Texas court attempts to guard by penal-
izing the issue of the share certificates.
The final question arise after it has been determined that the
shares or notes are unenforceable in the hands of the present
holders. What relief will the courts afford the "guilty" parties
from the potential liability represented by the power to trans-
fer such instruments to bona fide transferees? It is unfortu-
nately impossible to render such a transaction, once executed,
"void" in the sense that these outstanding instruments will have
no effect.40 Courts therefore entertain suits by the original
parties to cancel the instruments in the hands of the other party,
or of holders with notice.-" Further questions may be raised if
the maker of the note attempts to perfect the transaction by
tender of payment, 2 or if either party attempts to cancel with-
out tendering the instrument he has received. 3
For the resulting confusion, which may be worse in its effect
on corporate finance than the credit transaction sought to be
39 Collection of note by holder in due course: Washer v. Smyer, eurra
mote 31; Hamilton-Turner Grocery Co. v. Hander, 299 S. W. 843 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1927) ;, Wilson v. Spencer, 261 Fed. 357 (C. C. A. 5th, 1919);
Bank of Manila v. Wallace, wpra note 6.
Collection of note by receiver in bankruptcy for corporation: Meholin
v. Carlson, supra note 7; Mitchell v. Porter, cupra note 35; Soy v..God-
chaux, spra note 34; Smoot v. Perkins, 195 S. Wi 988 (Tex. Civ. App.
1917); Allen v. Edwards, 93 Miss. 719, 47 So. 382 (190); Thompson v.
First State Bank, supra note 34. Contra: Gridley v. Tilson, 202 Cal. 748,
262 Pac. 322 (1927); Terrell v. Warten, 206 Ala. 90, 89 So. 297 (1921);
of. Goodyear" v. Meux, 143 Tenn. 287, 228 S. W. 57 (1921); Clark v.
Hamilton, 217 Fed. 229 (C. C. A. 8th, 1914). See Waterman, op. cit.
.upra star note, at 235.
As to the rights of bona fide transferees for value of the share certif-
iates, see RESTATEMENT OF THE LA W OF BusiNEss ASsOCA.TIoND (Am.
L. Inst. 1928) § 23, stating that such persons become shareholders.
-0 See Comment (1928) 37 YAIE L. S. 362.
4 1 Suit to cancel notes: Prudential Life Ins. Co. v. Pearson, 188 S. W.
513 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916), rev'd on other grounds, 222 S. W. 967 (Te.
Comm. App. 1920); .Southwestern Tank Co. v. Morrow, supra note 17;
Lone Star Life Ins. Co. v. Pierce, 200 S. W. 1104 (Te. Civ. App. 1918);
-General Bonding & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Moseley, supra note 18, -rev'd on other
grounds, 110 Tex. 529, 222 S. W. 961 (1920). Contra: Domenigoni v.
Imperial Livestock Co., 189 Cal. 467, 209 Pac. 36 (1922); of. Thronson' v.
Universal Mfg. Co., 164 Wis. 44, 159 N. W. 575 (1916). Suit to cancel
shares: Sohland v. Baker, supra note 18; cf. Cahall v. Lofland, 12 Del.
,Ch. 299, 114 AtI. 224 (1921).
42 See supra note 10.
4 3 See Cahall v. Lofland, supra note 41, at 318, 114 AtL. at 234.
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prevented, there are two possible remedies. One is to leave the
enforcement of these statutory provisions to the state, and allow
the parties to contract as they choose, with discretion in the
attorney-general as to prosecution. This by itself would prob-
ably allow corporations great latitude in creating shares for
notes." Any' further measure is based on the assumption that
behind these statutory provisions there is a sound economic
policy. If it is possible by one means or another to circumvent
the statute,, if the directors have a wide discretion as to such
issues, and if an elastic method of marketing is desirable, then
the solution is to make the directors and officers responsible to
the same extent as indorsers upon all notes received in payment
for shares.45 This is no panacea; it would still leave the wavy
line between shareholders and subsclibers,40 but it might have
the effect of forcing the directors either to make more than a
casual inspection of the notes and collateral, or to refrain from
creating shares for notes. Both security and flexibility within
limits laid down by the attorney-general might thus be achieved.
Underlying the entire problem of enforcement is the economic
question of the real value of the provision when enforced. If
all business enterprises could be run on liquid capital they would
no doubt be more prosperous. This fact, however, is quite ap-
parent to directors, and where they can get cash for shares it
will no doubt be sufficiently to their interest to do so." But
should the corporation which cannot sell its shares for cash be
allowed to market them as best it can, for notes? The question
is far too general-there is, of course, no such thing as the cor-
poration, or a community need for a corporation. But the com-
munity may need a railroad or otlher public utility, and be will-
ing to take certain chances with respect to their financial struc-
tures in order to secure the undoubted advantages of their opera-
tion.48
The entire system of regulation designed to insure that a cor-
poration receive or maintain the par value of its shares will be
of little aid to creditors if the venture is unsuccessful. Thus, in
4 But see HANimBOOK OF NATIONAL CONFERUNCD OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATB LAWS (1927) 823.
-s Cf. N. D. Coip. LAWS ANN. (1913) §§ 4528, 4529, MAss. GEN. LAWS
(1921) c. 156, §§ 16, 36. Cases suggesting such responsibility are rare.
Cf. Bank of Commerce v. Goolsby, supra note 6; Cochrill v. Abeles, 86
Fed. 505 (C. C. A. 8th, 1898).
-6 In German Mercantile Co. v. Wanner, supra note 16, the court evaded
such a statute by calling the transaction a subscription, after first deciding
that it was sufficiently an "issue of shares" to have come within the con-
stitutional prohibition had the notes not been considered the "property"
required by the constitution.
47 This statement fails to take into account cases in which the directors
issue shares to themselves or their adherents in return for notes in order
to retain control of the corporation. Cf. Cahall v. Lofland, supra note 41.
is See supra note 20.
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the case of the provision herein discussed, cash or notes when
invested in an unproductive oil well are about of equal value.
Once either has been used to purchase fixed assets, the receipt of
par value may not protect creditors, except insofar as it frees
the corporation from certain claims arising out of the indorse-
ment of bad notes. But if the par value received has been sunk
in a dry oil w&ell, the creditors' dividend will be so small that a
few bad notes will hardly matter. It may also be said that the
system of regulation discussed has been tacitly repudiated to
some extent in those states permitting the issue of shares without
par value.
A further objection to the emphasis which statutes of this type
lay upon insuring the receipt of par value is based on the
absence of reliance. 9 How many creditors judge an old estab-
lished business on the basis of what was paid for its shares?
How many old established concerns are forced to sell shares
for notes? If new corporations are most likely to infringe these
statutes, will not the transaction be so apparent on their books
and reports that many prospective creditors and purchasers of
shares will be warned? Is not a requirement of such publicity of
accounts, rather than an absolute prohibition of these trans-
actions, the remedy? o
It can at least be said that the statutory provision with which
this article commences, unless made both more detailed and flex-
ible by further legislation, is quite unworkable. All corporations
should not necessarily be treated alike; a regulation of this type
laid down by the Blue Sky Commission may be wise but a blanket
provision foolish.-" It may further be said that legislatures in
framing provisions limiting the creation of shares should be
careful to specify the legal consequences of attempts to violate
such provisions and not leave courts to struggle with a large
and complex problem on the facts of a single case.52
RIOEaPD MAnR' PASKUS.
EXTERRITORIAL RECOGNITION OF INJUNCTIONS AGAINST SUIT
It is well settled - that a court of equity may, within its dis-
cretion,2 issue an injunction forbidding a plaintiff to sue in a
40 See Waterman, op. cit. suna. star note, at 442.
The UNIroRmi BUSINESS CORPORATION Aor (1927) § 18 provides for
such publicity.
5 See BALLANTINE, op. cit. supra note 28, at 663.
It is for the lack of such specific provisions that the vriter vould
particularly criticize the UiwonR BusINESs CORPORATION Acr, =upa note
50.
'Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107, 10 Sup. Ct. 269 (1890); Weaver
v. Alabama Great So. Ry., 200 Ala. 432, 76 So. 364 (191"/); MLsouri
Pacific Ry. v. Harden, 158 La. 889, 105 So. 2 (1925); HIGh, INSUNCTIONS
(4th ed. 1905) § 106; STORY, Equrnr JURISPRUDEN cE (13th ed. 1886) §§
899, 900; POMEoY, EQUITABLn REmEIES (3d ed. 1905) § 670.
2Cf. Pound, Thi Progress of the Law (1920) 33 HARM. L. REV. 420,
426: "Undoubtedly a state may coerce its citizens not to sue abroad.
19301
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foreign state. And the authority to pronounce such a decree car-
ries with it the power to punish disobedience through contempt
proceedings. 3 But to a defendant, seeking relief from a vexa-
tious foreign suit, the issuance of the injunction and the threat
of negative "enforcement" are of no more than contributory
importance. His ultimate concern is with the positive prohibitive
effectiveness of the injunction in preventing the foreign suit.
This effectiveness is dependent upon the active recognition which
will be accorded the injunction by. the courts of the sister state
when the plaintiff disobeys the decree and attempts to sue.
The problem would be easy of solution if, as has been sug-
gested,5 injunctions. against suit were granted the automatic ex-
territorial recognition under the "full faith and credit" clause a
of the Federal Constitution which is considered obligatory
with some other types of equitable decrees. 7 But in the absence
It does not follow, however, that its courts of equity... ought to exercise
such jurisdiction in every case where it exists. We havd to ask: What
are the legal rights of the plaintiff in equity, defendant abroad, and are
the legal remedies which are open to him adequate to maintain those
rights? We have then to ask, is the injustice and hardship upon the plain-
tiff such as to make it expedient for equity to act, in view of the delicate
considerations involved in interference with legal proceedings in other
states?"
For judicial consideration of the discretional angle, compare the opinion
in Folkes v. Georgia Central Ry., 202 Ala. 376, 80 So. 458 (1918) (deny-
ing injunction), -with that in Northern Pacific Ry. v. Richey and Gilbert,
132 Wash. 526, 232 Pac. 355 (1925). (granting injunction). And see
(1919) 28 YTAi L. J. 503.
3 See State ex rel. Bossung v. District Court, 140 Minn. 494, 498, 108
N. W. 589, 591 (1918); Union Pacific R. R. v. Rule, 155 Minn. 302, 305,
193 N. W. 161, 162 (1923).
4 See Note -(1919) 1 A. L. R. 148.
(1923) 33 YATn L. J. 95, 96.
eU. S. CONSTrITUTION Art. IV, § 1: "Full faith and credit shall be
given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings
of every other state. And Congress may . . . prescribe the manner in
which .. . [they] shall be proved, and the effect thereof."
7 Equitable, decrees entitled to exterritorial recognition under the "full
faith and credit" clause include:
(a) Those for the payment of a specific sum of money. Lynde v. Lynde,
181 UQ. S. 183, 21 Sup. Ct. 555 (1901); Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U. S. 1
30 Sup. Ct. 682 (1910); 2 BLACK, UnoDmENTS (1891) § 869; 1 CooK,
CASES ON EQurTy (1923). 329n.
(b) Certain decrees concerning the conveyance of land. Burnley v. Steven-
son, 24 Ohio St. 474 (1873). And see on this general subject Barbour,
The Extra-te7itorial Effect of the Equitable Decree (1919) 17 MIoH. L.
Rnv. 5271; Lorenzen, Application of Ful Fait& and Credit Clauso to
Equitable. Decrees for the Conveyance of Foreign Land (1925) 34 YATM
L. J. 591; Goodrich, Enforcement of a Foreign Equitable Decreo (1920) 5
IowA L. BuLL. 230.
(c). Divorce decrees, within certain limitations. Atherton v. Atherton,
181- U. S. 155, 21 Sup. Ct. 544 (1901); of. Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S.
5Q2, 26 Sup. Ct. 525 (1906).
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of specific constitutional or statutory designation and of any
direct ruling by the Supreme Court on the point,8 such recogni-
tion has not been accorded as a matter of course. Even those
courts which have summarily dismissed suits brought under the
shadow of a foreign injunction have not felt themselves forced
to such action by the "full faith and credit" clause The opinion
of two dissenting justices, in one of the leading cases allowing
suit?0 seems to be the only judicial argument for obligatory
recognition, under the Constitution, of foreign decrees against
suit.
The question thus resolves itself to one of a discretionary
nature. Should a state, even though it need not, close its courts
to a plaintiff who has been forbidden to sue by the judicial edict
of another state? The apparent answer of the cases has been
in the negative. A majority of the rulings on the point have
allowed the disobedient plaintiff to sue.7 But it is submitted
that a critical analysis of the holdings will show the numerical
8 Al-inclusive dicta are common. A recent and typical Supreme Court
expression is voiced by Sanford, J., in Roche v. McDonald, 27q U. S. 449,
451, 48 Sup. Ct. 142, 143 (1928): 'It is settled by repeated decisions of
this Court that the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution re-
quires that the judgment of a State court which had jurisdiction of the
parties and the subject-matter in suit, shall be given in the courts of
every other State the same credit, validity and effect -which it has in the
Siate where it was rendered and be equally conclusive upon the
merits; . . !I
Compare an even stronger statement made by a lower federal court in
Beal v. Carpenter, 235 Fed. 273, 279 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916): 1... the Sup-
reme Court has conclusively determined that in a suit upon a judgment
or decree of the court of another state the same credit and' effect must
be given to it by the court in vhich suit upon the judgment or decree is
brought as -would be given to it in the foreign state . . . But cares
cited in support of this proposition refer only to decrees for the pay-
ment of money.
9 Fisher v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 112 Miss. 30, 72 So. 846 (1916);
Allen v. Chicago, Great Western R. R., 239 Ill. App. 38 (1925).10 Union Pacific R. R. v. Rule, supra note 3, at 306, 193 N. W. at 162.
2.Cases permitting suit: Nichols & Shepard Co. v. Wheeler, 150 Ky.
169, 150 S. W. 33 (19125 (Tennessee interlocutory decree held no bar
-without discussion); State ex re. Bossung v. District Court, supra note
3; Frye v. Chicago R. I. & P. Ry., 157 Minn. 52, 195 N. W. 629 (1923),
certiorari denied, 263 U. S. 723, 44 Sup. Ct. 231 (1924); Union Pacific
R. R. v. Rule, s-=pra note 3; Kepner v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry., 16
S. W. (2d) 825 (Mo. 1929) (evidence of foreign injunction rejected);
cf. Hovel v. Minneapolis & St. L. By., 165 Minn- 449, 206 N. W. 710
(1926); Chicago R. L & P. By. v. Lundquist, 206 Iowa 499, 221 N. W.
228 (1928).
Cases rejecting suit: Fisher v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co.; Allen v.
Chicago Great Western B. R., both supr, note 9; cf. Gilman v. Ketcham,
84 Wis. 60, 54 N. W. 395 (1893) (foreign injunction against creditors,
in dissolution proceedings, held to give receiver preferential claim when
creditor attempts to garnishee a debt).
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answer to be an illusory one, inasmuch as -the decisions seem
largely to; be affected by considerations and factors outside the
purely discretionary problem.
State ex rel. Bossung v. District Court," the leading case
allowing suit, is a Minnesota case, and its decision is based
primarily on ai line of Minnesota decisions1 3 holding that, under
the equal "privileges and immunities" clause 14 of the Federal
Constitution, it is not within the discretion of a state court to
-refuse jurisdiction to a non-resident which would be granted to
a resident plaintiff, no matter how cogent may be the reasons
of policy 34 which may seem to make the granting of the privi-
lege undesirable. The court argues that, inasmuch as no foreign
injunction could force the court to close its doors to a resident
of Minnesota, it may not discriminate to the extent of recogniz-
ing the injunction against a foreign suitor.10 The "equal privi-
leges and immunities" clause, as previously interpreted by the
Minnesota courts, is thus held controlling, although the "full
faith and credit" clause would seenM to tend toward an opposite
result. In view of a recent Supreme Court holding that a
discretionary refusal of jurisdiction to a non-resident is not
a denial of constitutional privileges,1 the argument of the Bos-
12Siupra note 3. In this case, the plaintiff was seeking a writ of man-
damus to compel the Minnesota court to proceed with an action in which
the plaintiff was suing as administrator of a person killed in Nebraska.
Both parties to the original suit were residents of Iowa. The defendant
railroad had secured a temporary injunction in Nebraska restraining
the plaintiff from proceeding in Minnesota. The lower Minnesota court
had then stayed the proceedings until final hearing on the Nebraska in-
junction. But on appeal mandamus issued, it being considered immaterial
whether the Nebraska injunction should be made permanent or dissolved.
3: The leading cases are State ex rel. Prall v. District Court, 126
Minn. 501, 148 N. W. 463 (1914) and Davis v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.
Ste. M. R. R., 134 Minn. 455, 159 N. W. 1084 (1916).
14 U. S. CONSTiTuTiON Art. IV, § 2 (1).: "The citizens of each state shall
be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states."
.S Among the most obvious are annoyance and expense caused the de-
fendant, and waste of the court's time and resources, leading to crowded
dockets, and the burdening of local taxpayers. See Comment (1930) 39
YALE L. J. 388, 398 et seq. and notes.
20 Cassoday, C. J., in Eingartner v. Illinois Steel Co., 94 Wis. 70, 68
N. W. 664 (1896), employs an ingenious dialectic to evade the applica-
tion of the above clause to force jurisdiction of suits by non-residents.
He reasons that, inasmuch as one state can not grant its citizens the
privilege to sue in another state, therefore it need not grant a citizen
of the other state the coyrresponzding privilege of suit in a state of which
he is not a citizen.
17 Douglas v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 279 U. S. 377, 49 Sup. Ct.
355 (1929). The court upheld a distinction between "residence" and
"citizenship" as a basis for refusing jurisdiction of a suit under a New
York statute. This distinction had previously been supported by some
state courts. Central R. R. & Banking Co. v. Georgia Co., 32 S. C. 319,
11 S. E. 192 (1890); Hatfield v. Sisson, 28 Misc. 255, 59 N. Y. Supp. 73
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-sung case is no longer persuasive. A lower Minnesota court has
already contravened the long-standing Minnesota rule by re-
fusing to entertain a series of vexatious suits by non-residenta
Later cases in Minnesota and elsewhere, allowing suit in the
face of a foreign injunction," have merely cited the Bossung
decision as controlling or desirable, in refusing to apply the "full
faith and credit" clause. The further argument was advanced
in one case 20 that, since the United States Supreme Court had
determined = that the clause in question did not require Tennes-
see to recognize an Alabama statute denying a claimants right to
sue outside Alabama, therefore an Iowa injunction against
foreign suit was not necessarily entitled to recognition in Min-
nesota. But from the discretionary angle, the specific decree
of an equity court with the parties before it might well be
granted readier exterritorial recognition than the blanket
decree of a legislature. -
More important than a refutation of the arguments advanced
in refusing recognition of the foreign injunctions i& considera-
tion of the fact that the actual decisions were apparently made
not only in spite of the injunctions but in complete disregard
of them. Thus the Minnesota court decided the Bossztug case as
though the injunction had never existed. It reasoned, and the
courts in the later cases reasoned correspondingly, = that,
inasmuch as the Minnesota rule forced the court to entertain
(Sup. Ct. 1899); Loftus v. Pennsylvania R. BL, 107 Ohio St. 352, 140
N. E. 94 (1923). And the Supreme Court had sustained such a distinc-
tion for other purposes. La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U. S. 465, 39 Sup.
Ct. 160 (1919); Miaxwell v. Bugabee, 250 U. S. 525, 40 Sup. Ct. 2
(1919). For discussions of this poin see Hansell, The Prop cr Foru.
for Suits Against Foreign Corporations (1927) 27 COL. L. REv. 12, 16;
Blair, The Doctrine of Foru Non Covenicns in Anglo-American aiv
(1928) 28 CoL. L. Ruv. 1, 3; Note (1928). 41 HARy: L. Rev. 87; Note
(1928) 28 CoL. L. B u. 347; (1903) 17 HARV. L. RV. 54
is The decisions were made by Judge Senn of Steele County, and wee
noted in the New York Sun, Oct. 18, 1929, at 28. 
..
39 See cases cited supra note 11.
2oUfion Pacific R. R. v. Rule, supra, note 3.
2 1 Tennessee Coal, Iron, & R. B. Co., v. George, 233 U. S. 354, 34 Sup. Ct.
587 (1914).
22See Comment (1924) 22 ,IOcHr. L. RBu. 469, 472. And'cf. Hovel v.
3Minndapolis & St. L. Ry., smra note 11, in which the premise and con-
clusion of the argument in the Rule case were reversed, the court reason-
ing that since an injunction forbidding suit has no exterritorial elrect,
a fortiori as to a statute.
23 It is significant that Iissouri, which followed the Bossung decision
in Kepner v. By., supre note 11, has long had a rule, similar to the Min-
nesota rule, denying its courts the privilege to refuse jurisdiction to non-
residents, because of the equal "'privileges and immunities" clause. State
e% rel. Pacific Mutual! Life Ins. Co. v. Grimm, 239 Mo. 135, 143 S. W.
483 (1911)*; Gold Iss4e Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania Fire Ins.
-Co., 267 Mo. 524, 184 S. W. 999 (1916).
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such a suit by a non-resident, therefore the instant non-resi-
dent was entitled to sue.24 • The non-recognition of the injunction
was merely incidental. The basic reason of the decision would
have been! precisely the same had the defendant presented his
arguments against the foreign suit directly to the Minnesota
court instead of presenting that court with an injunction pre-
sumably based on those arguments.
Even in the two cases dismissing suit,-^ although the courts
sleak of the "comity" of recognizing the injunction of a sister
state, the actual decisions seem to rest on broader grounds. In
Allen v. Chicago Great Western R. R.,2 the Illinois court is
primarily concerned with denying the applicability of the "privi-
leges and immunities" clause to force jurisdiction of the suit
upon it; and the mention of the apparently vexatious nature of
the suit, almost in justification of the granting of the Iowa
decree, leads inevitably to the conclusion that the court would
have reached the same decision by the same implicit reasoning
had the defendant protested the Illinois jurisdiction without the
aid of an Iowa injunction. And in Fisher v. Pacific Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 27 the Mississippi court recognized the Tennessee
decree as a matter of comity, only in that it refused to question
the correctness of the Tennessee finding as to the desirability of
prohibiting suit in Mississippi-a recognition which implies as
24 In Dobson v. Pearce, 12 N. Y. 156 (1854), the Connecticut court
had enjoined the plaintiff'from suing on a judgment, on the ground that
it was fraudulent. The plaintiff brought suit in New York regardless.
The New York court, in deciding for the defendant, held that the Con-
necticut judgment was conclusive as to the fraud, but said: "The decree
of the court of chancery of the state of Connecticut as an operative
decree, so. far as it enjoined and restrained the parties, had and has no ex-
traterritorial efficacy,.. ." The older New York rule, like the Minnesota
and Missouri rules, did not permit a discretionary refusal of jurisdiction
to a non-resident. MacIvor v. McCabe, 26 How. Pr. 257 (N. Y. 1863);
Dewitt v. Buchanan, 54 Barb. 31 (N. Y. 1868).
25 Fisher v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co.; Allen v. Chicago Great Western
R. R., both supra note 9.
2oSupra note 9. Here the plaintiff, a resident of Iowa, had started
suit in Iowa on a transitory cause of action arising there. He subse-
quently began suit in Illinois. The defendant asked the Illinois court for
a continuance because of a prior Iowa decree enjoining suit by the plaintiff
in Illinois. On appeal, the decision of the lower court was reversed and the
continuance granted.
27Supra note 9. The plaintiff brought suit in Mississippi on an insurance
policy drawn up in Tennessee between' the plaintiff's decedent, who 'was a
citizen of Tennessee, and the defendant, which was doing business there.
The insured had died from injuries received in Tennessee. Previous to
this action in Mississippi, the plaintiff had been prosecuting suit for several
years in Tennessee. An injunction issued in Tennessee restraining the
plaintiff from suing in Mississippi. On appeal, the Mississippi court af-
firmed a dismissal of the Mississippi suit.
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its basis not the formal decree itself but the facts which must
be assumed as underlying the decree.
The discretionary recognition of the foreign decree thus be-
comes entirely merged in the largel question of discretionay"
entertainment of suit by a non-resident. This latter prob-
lem, involving conflicting rules of law and countless considera-
tions of policy, has been adequately treated elsewhere.- It will
suffice here to indicate that, in the reported cases, the larger
problem has exerted so overpowering an influence that the ef-
fect of the foreign injunction against suit has been negligible
in its direct bearing on judicial action. But the argument ad-
vanced in the Fishe case, that principles of comity should at
least dictate an acceptance of the conclusion of the foreign
court as to the advisability of allowing the suit in question, is
convincing. There is no reason -why the courts of one state
should question the discretionary judgment of the court of a
sister state, particularly when a remedy for possible error lies
in appellate review.0 And it is unfortunate that a line of cases
ignoring the foreign decree originated in -what has since proven
a mistaken apprehension of the limits to discretionary power
under the Federal Constitution.
The resultant confusion of decisions has led the American Bar
Association to introduce into Congress a bill which would in
effect definitely extend the application of the "full faith and
credit" clause to all equitable decrees.n Made quicldy and
simply operative by means of a registry system similar to that
28 Cf. Note. (1924) 32 A. L. R. 6, 66.
-Comment (1930) 39 YIALs L. J. 388; Comment (1930) I8 CAzI. L.
REv. 159; Note (1924) 32 A. L. R. 6. And see Comment (1928) 37 YAXE
L. 3. 983.
20 See Fisher v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., sura notW 9, at 36, 72
So. at 848.
The bill, drawn up by the Committee on Surfvrudence and Law Re-
form of the American Bar Association, provides in part: "That -whenever
any judgment, decree or order shall be rendered by any court of record of
the United States or of any state or territory thereof, having jurisdiction
of the subject matter and of the parties, requiring that money be paid, or
that any act shall or shall not be done, or establishing a status, or invest-
ing any person with authority over property, such judgment decree or
order may be registered in any other of said courts, having jurisdiction
to render similar judgments, decrees or orders, and when so registered
shall have such faith and credit given to it as it has by law or usag in
the court -wherein it was rendered, and for the purpose of enforcement or
utilization it shall have the same effect and like proceedings may be taken
thereon as if the judgment, decree or order had been originally rendered
by the court in -which registratiqn is had." See (1927) 52 A. B. A. Rep.
292 et seq.
The fall power of Congress to make necessary provisions for the en-
forcement of the "full faith and creditV' clause is expressly granted in
the Article itself. Supir note 6.
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now used in Australia,3 2 the proposed act would force a court
summarily to dismiss -a suit brought by a plaintiff whom the
court of any other state had enjoined from bringing that suit.
An objection raised in the Bosswng case to obligatory recogni-
tion of the foreign injunction under the "full faith and credit"
clause is that! the possibility of a foreign court enjoining a
man from bringing suit in his own state would give the foreign
court "substantial control over our litigation." 33 But the fact
that in none of the reported cases was the plaintiff a citizen of
the state in which he was attempting to sue, coupled with a
reasonable assumption of judicial discretion 34 in the issuance
of such injunctions, makes the possibiity a remote one. And
even the slight danger of abuse of the power seems well over-
balanced by the advantages to be gained from a simple and
uniform rule which would protect a deserving defendant from
the annoyance and expense of vexatious foreign suits 35 instead
of leaving him at the mercy of an unscrupulous plaintiff and a
foreign court bothered about its privilege to decline
jurisdiction."
Until exterritorial recognition of injunctions against suit is
forced upon the courts by legislative enactment or a specifig
judicial ruling of the Federal Supreme Court, the wisest policy
seems to lie in voluntary recognition of the decree as controlling.
Uncertainty as to the power to refuse jurisdiction has been
substantially removed.37 Once the court which issues the in-
junction has passed judgment on the fact as to the desirability
of allowing suit inV another state, a review of those same facts
32 The Australian act providing for interstate enforcement of judgments
declares that "judgments" are to include "any judgment, decree, rule, or
order given or made by a Court in any suit whereby any sum of money
is made payable or any person is required to do or not to do any act or
thing other than the payment of money." AusTALIAw COMMONWEArT
ACTS, SEaVICE AND EXECUTION OF PRocEss AcT (1901-1924). § 3 (h). To
secure exterritorial efficacy without the burdensome and expensive suit
on a judgment, it is provided that a certificate thereof, registered in the
corresponding court, of any other state, shall be for all purposes the same
as a local judgment. Since Australia consists of a federal commonwealth
of states similar to ours, and the registry method has there been in opera-
tion for twenty-nine years, the example seems particularly valuable. See
Cook, The Powers of Congress Under the Full Faith and Credit Camuse
(1919) 28 YALE L. J. 421, 426 et seq., and appendices.
33 State ex rel. Bossung v. District Court, supra, note 3, at 498, 168 N.
W. at 591.
84 See supra note 2. See also Payne v. Knapp, 195 N. W. 1, 2 (Iowa
1923).
35 Cf. (1919) 2& YATE L. J. 503, 504.30 The questionable practice of searching for a foreign court noted for its
liberal awards has received judicial comment. See Lefebvre-Armistead Co. v.
So. Pacific Co., 142 Va. 800, 805, 128 S. E. 244, 245 (1925); Weinard v.
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 298 Fed. 977, 981 et seq. (D. Minn. 1924).
3T Reference is to the decision in the Douglas case, supra note 11.
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by a court of the other state seems unnecessarily repetitious,
and subject to all the criticism which has been levelled at the
practice of importing litigation3 And even if the second court
prefers to pass its own judgment on the advisability of allow-
ing the suit in question, it would seem that the mere granting
of an injunction by another court should in itself be a strongly
persuasive fact toward a refusal to take jurisdiction.0
AGREEMENTS NOT TO DEFEND
It seems generally to be assumed that agreements to waive
all defenses to any action which might be brought against a
party are against public-policy and for that reason will not be
enforced by the courts. A dictum to this effect uttered by the
United States Supreme Court in 18912 has been reiterated in
the recent case of Nije v. Chase Nat. Rank-.2 But where partic-
ular defenses alone are waived, there is a contrariety of result,
said to depend upon whether the agreement to waive the par-
ticular defense is or is not against "public policy." What consti-
tute the criteria of "public policy" can only be determined by
a study of the many decisions dealing with such provisions and
stipulations3
A distinction should be observed at the outset between the
ordinary agreement to confess judgment on a liquidated debt
and an agreement not to defend on any grounds at any time.
Typical of the former is p provision in a mortgage or in an in-
denture agreement made in connection with a bond issue whereby
the debtor agrees to consent to the entry of judgment for princi-
pal, premium and interest upon default.4 Judgment notes war-
38 See Comment (1930) 39 YALE L. T. 388, 397 et seq. and notes.
W The decision in the Fisher case, supra note 9, was based upon some-
what similar reasoning.
' Pope Mifg. Co. v. Gormilly, 144 U. S. 224, 234 12 Sup. Ct. 632, 636
(1891): If one should agree for a valuable consideration that he would
set up no defense to any action which another might bring against him
and such person might enter up judgment against him in any such action
without notice, we think no court would hesitate to pronounce such an
agreement invalid."
234 F. (2d) 435 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929). In this case the guarantors
attempted to escape from their responsibility on the ground that, the pro-
vision waiving all defenses being invalid, the -whole guaranty contract, was
thereby invalidated. The court held that the provision, while in itself void,
had no such effect o" the rest of the agreement.
a For an encyclopedic treatment of this general subject see PAGE;, CoN-
TRAcTS (2d ed. 1920) c. 23.
4The following is a typical agreement: "The company covenants that
after the happening of any event of default and at and immediately upon
the commencement of any action, suit or other legal proceeding by the
trustee to obtain judgment for the principal of, or premium or interest on,
the debentures . . . it will waive the issuance and service of process and
1930] 727
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ranting an attorney to confess judgment on a certain date have
also long been recognized as valid at common law and are
usually provided for by statute.5 They are made as a matter of
convenience to avoid a court trial which is unnecessary where
there is a definite sum due at a certain time. Nothing is said
in. such agreements, however, about waiving defenses. Judg-
ment alone is confessed and the debtor is not precluded from
moving to vacate or open the judgment rendered against him
when he can show the court that he has a valid defense.0 If
an agreement to waive all defenses were to be held enforceable,
the result would in effect be that jiidgmeilt would not only be
confessed but the defendant would not thereafter be able to dis-
pute its finality. And in the situation where a waiver of certain
defenses only is held enforceable the effect is not that judgment
is confessed, but that the defendant finds his hands tied at the
trial as to the issues specified in the agreement.
Cases involving reliance by third parties on these express
waivers of all or certain defenses must also be distinguished.
Thus a mortgagor may expressly agree to waive all defenses
in order to facilitate the negotiation of the mortgage,' or a debtor
may agree to waive all defenses as against an assignee of the
chose in action.8 In such cases the doctrine of estoppel prevents
enter its voluntary appearance in such action, suit or proceeding and con-
sent to the entry of a judgment for such principal, premium and interest
. . and for such other relief as the trustee may be entitled to here-
under." This provision is contained in an Indenture, dated April 15, 1925,
between Dodge Bros. and the Central Union Trust Co., trustee, in connec-
tion with an issue of debentures. Similar agreements contained in a mort-
gage empowering the mortgagee on any default in payment of principal
or interest to sell the mortgaged premises and apply the proceeds to the
debt are valid and enforceable. Wood v. Electric Light Co., 36 Fed. 538
(C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1888); Curran v. Houston, 201 11. 442, 66 N. E. 228
(1903); Hawkinson v. Banaghan, 203 Mass. 591, 89 N. E. 1054 (1909);
Smith v. Lamb, 59 Misc. 568, 111 N. Y. Supp. 455 (Sup. Ct. 1908).
5 3 FMMM1zAN, JUDGDONTS (5th ed. 1925) §§ 1302, 1303.
0 Cozart v. Haines, 68 Colo. 261, 188 Pac. 726 (1920); Fiedler v. Bishop,
198 fI1. App. 558 (1916); Lyon v. Welsh, 20 Iowa 578 (1866); Winternitz
v. Schmidt, 161 Wis. 421, 154 N. W. 626 (1915).
7 Smyth v. Munroe, 84 N. Y. 354 (1881) (mortgagor prevented from
setting up defense of usury as against assignee of mortgagee); Hutchinson
v. Gill, 91 Pa. 253 (1879) (mortgagor prevented from setting up no con-
sideration and fraud as against assignee, the mortgagee having absconded).
But of. Wilcox v. Howell, 44 N. Y. 398 (1871) (no estoppel if assignee did
not rely on the agreement).
a Angl6-California Trust Co. v. Hall, 61 Utah 223, 211 Pac. 991 (1922).
But of. San Francisco Corp. v. Phoenix Motor Co., 25 Ariz. 531, 220 Paa.
229 (1923) (statute specifically provided assignments of choses in action
should be without prejudice to any set-off or defense; held that mortgagor
could defend' on ground of fraud). The doctrine of estoppel is particularly
applicable in the law of bills and notes. Railroad & Banking Co. v. Stan-
brough, 1 La. Ann. 261. (1846).; Le Roy, v. Meadows, S8 Okla. 45, 200 Pac.
858 (1921); of. Enslen v. Bank, 255 Fed. 527 (C. C. A. 5th, 1919) (estoppel
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the defenses waived from.being interposed as against third
parties. As between parties to the contract, however, the ques-
tion is not one of estoppel but rather of the extent to which a
party may go in depriving himself in advance of well-recognized
rights and privileges. And so an agreement may operate to
deprive a party of all defenses against a third person and at
the same time have no legal effect with respect to the original
parties to the contract.
In the latter situation specific agreements to waive the defense
of fraud 9 or of usury,10 not to defend divorce proceedings," or
not to oppose the discharge of a debtor in banlaruptcy,12 are
universally regarded as so opposed to public policy as to be
illegal and void. Similarly the courts will not give effect to a
provision in a license agreement wherein the licensee promises
never to contest the validity of the patent; 13 to agreements waiv-
after renewal of note); Bank v. Larson, 47 S. D. 374, 199 NT. W. 46 (1924)
(maker estopped as against one purchasing directly from him); see
JoYcE, DEFMSEE TO CO=MRCLJ PAP= (1st ed. 1907) §§ 646-661.
9 The following agreement is illustrative: "It is erpressly understood
and agreed between the parties hereto that the said party of the first part
has not, in any manner or form, stated, made oi represented to the said
party of the second part.. . any statements or representations, verbally
or in writing, in any respect to the said business." It was held this did
not exclude the defense of fraud. Bridger v. Goldsmith, 143 N. Y. 424,
38 N. E. 458 (1894); see Fay & Egan v. Lumber Co., 178 Ala. 166, 168,
59 So. 470, 471 (1912); of. Malas v. Lounsbury, 193 Wis. 531, 214P N. W.
332 (1927). Agreements to waive all defenses do not preclude the defense
of fraud. Welch v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 108 Iowa 224, '78 N. W.
853 (1899); Ranchmen's Trust Co. v. Gill, 113 Ran. 261, 214 Pac. 413
(1923) (agreement not to defend -was itself obtained by fraud); Reagan
v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 189 Mass. 555, 76 N. E. 217 (1905).
'Where representations in a contract act as an inducement to a party
to enter into it, a clause to the effect that no reliance is to be placed on
such representations is inoperative. United States v. Atlantic Dredging
Co., 253 U. S. 1, 40 Sup. Ct. 423 (1920); Jackson v. State, 210 App. Div.
115, 205 N. Y. Supp. 658 (4th Dep'Vt 1924); Dieterich v. Rice, 115 Wash.
365, 197 Pac. 1 (1921) ; Note (1925) 3 N. Y. L. REV. 219; (1925) 25 COL. L.
REv. 231.
20 Union Nat. Bank v. Fraser, 63 Miss. 231 (1885); Mabee v. Crozier,
22 Hun. 264 (N. Y. 1880); Bosler v. Rheem, 72 Pa. 54 (1872); Sturgis
Nat. Bank v. Smith, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 540, 30 S. W. 678 (1895) ; Herrick v.
Dean, 54 Vt. 568 (1882) ; of. Smyth v. Munroe, supra note 7.
=Loveren v. Loveren, 106 Cal. 509, 39 Pac. 801 (1895); Smutzer v.
Stimson, 9 Colo. App. 326, 48 Pac. 314 (1897); Edleson v. Edleson, 179
Ky. 300, 200 S. W. 625 (1918)- Huber v. CuIp, 46 Oda. 570, 149 Pac.
216 (1915).12 Paton v. Stewart, 78 I 481 (1875) ; Blasdel v. Fowle, 120 Mass. 447
(1876); Sharp v. Teese, 9 N. J. L. 352 (1828); Bell v. Leggett, 1 N. Y.
176 (1852). Such agreements are now specifically'prohibited by the Bank-
ruptcy Act. U. S. ComPn. SwAr. AxN. (1916) § 9613; Marble v. Grant, 73
Me. 423 (1882) ; Fulton v. Day, 63 Wis. 112, 23 N. W. 99 (1885).
IsPope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, supra note 1; United States v. Standard
Oil (Indiana), 33 F. (2d) 617 (N. D. Ill. 1929); (1929) 39 YAx L. 0.
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ing statutory exemptions of property from execution; 14 to agree-
ments waiving provisions in the baikruptcy laws," emergency
rent laws,20 and eight-hour day statutes; " or to agreements
exempting landlords from responsibility for damages resulting
from illegal distraints. 8
The antagonistic attitude of the courts to such agreements is
to a great extent the result of historical prejudice. Judicial
views on public policy are largely determined by former deci-
sions, and the conservative nature of most courts prevents
sudden changes in traditional attitudes unless the public demand
is so insistent as to compel recognition of agreements once re-
garded as illegal. Primarily the public is interested in having
the court settle disputes in a manner satisfactory to litigants.
For the courts to allow the perpetration of fraud, simply because
one party has agreed not to interpose it as a defense, would be to
condone a practice always regarded as socially undesirable.9
On the other hand it is conceivable that the traditional attitude
290; of. Buffalo Specialty Co. v, Gougar, 26 Colo. App. 523, 144 Pac. 325
(1914). Where the agreement exists only for the life of the license it is
enf6rceable. Eskimo Pie Corp. v. National Ice Cream Co., 20 F. (2d)
1003 (W. D. Ky. 1927), aff'd, 26 F. (2d) 901 (C. C. A. 6th, 1928).
24 Industrial Loan & Investment Co. v. Superior Court, 189 Cal. 546,
209 Pac. 360 (1922) ; Weaver v. Lynch, 79 Colo. 537, 246 Pac. 789 (1926) ;
Harper v. Leal, 10 How. Pr. 276 (N. Y. 1854); Dean v. McMullen, 109
Ohio St. 309, 142 N. B. 683 (1923). But a mortgage on exempt property
acts as a waiver of the exemption privilege. Woods v. Davis, 153 Ky. 99,
154 S. W. 905 (1913); Kyle v. Sigur, 121 La. 888, 16 So. 910 (1908),;
Cammarano v. Langmire, 99 Wash. 360, 169 Pac. 806 (1918).
2 "The Bankruptcy Act would in the natural course of business be
nullified in the vast majority of debts arising out of contracts, if this
were permissible." Rugg, C. 3., in Federal Nat. Bank v. Koppel, 253 Mass.
157, 159, 148 N. E. 379, 380 (1925).
20 
"The preservation of the home is essential to the public welfare . . .
To give tenants the full benefit of these laws, they must be protected
against the acts of overreaching landlords, who seek to nullify the statutes
by requiring tenants who are forced to make new leases agree to waive
their provisions." St. Andrews Parish v. Gallagher, 121 Misc. 167, 170,
200 N. Y. Supp. 590, 593 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1923).
'7 Short v. Bullion-Beck Co., 20 Utah 20, 57 Pac. 720 (1899).
I8 Security Mortgage Co. v. Thompson, 66 Misc. 151, 121 X. Y. Supp.
326 (Sup. Ct. 1910); Watson v. Boswell, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 379, 61 S. W.
407 (1901). If the distraint is legal, such a! clause is operative. Watson
v. Mirike, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 527, 61 S. W. 538 (1901).
Such agreements not to seek affirmative relief for damages are more
closely analogous to provisions exempting public carriers from responsibil-
ity for negligence, which are generally held invalid. Liverpool & Great
Western Steam Co. v. Insurance Co., 129 U. S. 397, 9 Sup. Ct. 469 (1888).
But responsibility can be limited to a "reasonable extent." Adams Express
Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491, 33 Sup. Ct. 148 (1912).
29 The maxim "fraud vitiates every contract" is sometimes regarded as
applicable to the no-defense provision as well as to the rest of the contract.
Welch v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., supra note 9, at 230, 78 N. W. at 855.
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toward marriage may so change that courts will regard agree-
ments not to defend divorce proceedings as valid. At the present
day, however, such agreements are unhesitatingly declared i-
legal.20
In determining the policy of a state its courts frequently look
to the statutes for guidance. Laws as to usury, bankrmptcy,
propeity exemption, landlords and tenants, and hours of em-
ployment- are interpreted by the courts as declaratory of public
policy.= But not infrequently dispute arises as to whether the
law waswintended to prohibit certain practices generally, or to
confer a privilege upon the individual which might be waived
by him as he saw fit. So while the usury lawg are regarded by
the courts as. an expression of public policy, it is apparent today
that high rates of interest are not considered as pernicious as
was formerly the case.? In view of the fact that there are
many ways of avoiding the statute it may. be contended that a
party should now be held to have the power to agre% to pay
higher rates and waive 'the benefit of the statute if he so de-
sires. But the attitude of the courts toward other statutes
designed to protect debtors, tenants, employees, and vendees is
based on the ground that such persons more often contract on
an unequal plane and are coerced into waiving certain defenses
which the legislature has considered as socially desirable for
them to possess. So when an improvident debtor has agreed
to waive all exemptions to his personal property the courts will
refuse to give effect to his agreement on the theory that "the ob-
ject of our statutes is to protect those little communities called
'families' in the possession and enjoyment of those articles of
prime necessity without which they cannot exist; and the state
has a deep interest in their preservation." 21
On the other hand courts will permit individuals to waive in
advance some privileges even though conferred by statute. There
has been considerable dispute as to whether the statute of limi-
20 "There is an intimate connection between the sanctity of the marriage
relation and the well-being of society." Smutzer v. Stimson, cupre note 11,
at 327, 48 Pac. at 315.
21 Supra, notes 10, 14, 15, 17 and 18. A statute declaring that the assign-
ment of a chose in action shall be without prejudice to any set-off or defense
has also been regarded as conclusive of public policy. San Francisco
Corp. v. Phoenix Motor Co., supra note 8.
2?,"A party may, undoubtedly, without trenching upon public policy,
waive the defense of usury, or of the statute of frauds, or of the statute
of limitations, by omitting to set up the defense -when sued . .. but no
case has occurred to me in which a party can, in advance, make a valid
promise that a statute founded on public policy shall be inoperative."
Shapley v. Abbott, 42 N. Y. 443, 452 (1870). See Crowe v. Liquid Carbonic
Co., 208 N. Yt 396, 403, 102 N. E. 573, 575 (1913).
23 See Comment (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 408.
2
- Harper v. Lea], stpra. note 14, at 282.
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tations is designed for the benefit of the public or for individual
litigants, but the tendency of most courts today is to hold not
only that agreements to shorten the period or extend it for a
reasonable time are valid, but also that the statute may be
waived entirely.0 The right to a trial by jury and certain
statutory rules of evidence, such as the presumption that a party
is legally dead after an absence of seven years, may also be
waived.y
Between these two views is a dividing line constantly chang-
ing with the mutations in judicial interpretations, of public
policy. While the attitude toward the statute of limitations is
an indication of greater liberality, adherence to long tradition
is evidenced by the persistent refusal of the courts in the absence
of special legislation to enforce agreements to arbitrate.2 8 The
rule that such agreements are invalid, "probably originating in
the contests of the different courts in ancient times for extent
of jurisdiction," 20 is so opposed to public policy as to provoke
'-Page County v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 205 Iowa 798, 216 NT. W. 957
(1927); Eliot Nat. Bank v. Beal, 141 Mass. 566,, 6 N. 'E. 742 (1886);
Kulberg v. Supreme Council, 135 Minn. 150, 160 N. W. 685 (1916); of.
Columbia Security Co. v. Aetna Accident & Liability Co., 108 Wash. 116,
183 Pac. 137 (1919); Note (1928) 26 MicH. L. Rzv. 810; (1927) 11 MINN.
L. RIv. 282.20 Parchen v. Chessman, 49 Mont, 826, 146 Pac. 469 (1914); Note ANN.
CAS. 1916A 686; Lydon Savings Bank v. International Co., 79 Vt. 169, 62
Atl. 50. (1905); Note (1926) 14 CALIF. L. Rzv. 126; (1925) 74 U. o0 PA.
L. Ruv. 193. Contra.: First Nat. Bank v. Mock, 70 Colo. 517, 203 Pae. 272
(1921); Johnson v. Merritt, 125 Va. 162, 99 S. E. 785 (1919).
7 Waiver of Tial by Jury: Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 4 Wheat. 235
(U. S. 3819); Boyden v. Lamb, 152 Mass. 416, 25 N. E. 609 (1890)1;
Berkowitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, 230 N. Y. 261, 130 N. E. 288 (1921).
Ride of Evidencg: Presumption of death by absence. Steen v. Modern
Woodmen, 296 Ill. 104, 129 N. E. 546 (1921). Contra: Cobble v. loyal
Neighbors, 291" Mo. 125, 236 S. W. 306 (1921). What is to constitute
conclusive evidence of debtor's responsibility. U. S. Fidelity Co. v. Baker,
136 Ark. 227, 206 S. W. 314 (1918); U. S. Fidelity Co. v. Connors, 222
Ill. App. 1 (1921). Eyewitnesses not necessary for proof of injury.
Becker v. Bus. Men's Ass'n, 0265 Fed. 508 (C. C. A. 8th, 1920). See
Isaacs, Contiactual Control over Adjective Law (1922)' 29 W. VA. L. Q.
1; Wigmore, Contracts to Change Rules of Evidence (1921) 65 Am. LAW
REv. 823, As to waiver of the Statute of Frauds, of. Little v. Union Oil
Co. of Cal., 73 Cal. App. 612, 238 Pac. 1066 (1925) (such an agreement
is not operative unless there is reliance and resulting injury).
2 8 Grocery Co. v. Talladega Grocery Co., 217 Ala. 334, 116 So. 356 (1928);
Hudson Trading Co. v. Durand, 194 App. Div. 248, 185 N. Y. Supp. 187 (1st
Dep't 1920). For general discussion of this subject see Cohen, The Law of
Commercial Arbitration and the New York Statute (1921) 81 YArm L. J.
147; Sturges, Commercial Arbitration or Court Application of Common Law
Rules of Marketing? (1924) 34 YAra L. J. 480; Grossman, Trade Security
under Arbitration Laws (1925) 35 YAral L. J. 308; Commorcial Arbitration
in England (1916). 12 A=. JUD. Soo. BuLL. 7.
20 Lord Campbell in Scott v. Avery, 5 H. L. Cas. 811, 852 (1856).
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insistent demands for special legislation authorizing arbitration
provisions. 0 In spite of this, however, the very reason assigned
for holding these agreements invalid is that they "oust the courts
of their jurisdiction" and are therefore "against public policy."
It may be noted that, perhaps unconsciously, this fear of being
ousted has been overcome to the extent of permitting parties to
waive in advance their right to appeal, thus restricting jurisdic-
tion to the trial court.s
While public policy, according to judicial opinion, clearly de-
crees in certain cases that agreements not to defend are invalid,
courts cannot overlook the argument that such terms voluntarily
inserted in a contract often constitute an important part of the
consideration. This frequently occurs in the case of tenants
exempting their landlords from responsibility for losses incurred
by fire, water, etc.,03 in contracts exempting private carriers
from responsibility for negligence on their part,-, or in agree-
ments not to contest wills. How far should the courts go in
giving effect to the terms of such an agreement and how far in
declaring public policy? The answer to this question depends
on the particular problem in controversy, on the traditional
views on public policey involved, on the economic advantages and
disadvantages which will result from a decision either way, on
the extent of equality in bargaining position, and on the amount
of the consideration represented by the provision.
Inasmuch as there are agreements to waive certain defenses
which are clearly invalid, an agreement to waive all defenses,
s0 Legislation has recently been passed making arbitration agreements
enforceable by the courts. 11 U. S. C. § 52 (b) (1926); Miss. Cu.
STAT. (1927) c. 251, § 2; N. J. COMP. STAT. (Cum. Supp. 1925) § 9-21;
N. Y. ANN. CoNs. LAws (Cum. Supp. 1918-20). c. 72, § 2; On&. LAws
(Supp. 1928) c. 26; 52 & 53 VIOr. c. 49 (1889).
n See United States Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum
Co., 222 Fed. 1006, 1008 (S. D. N. Y. 1915).323Hoste v. Dalton, 137 Mich. 522, 100 N. W. 750 (1904); Riggs v. In-
surance Co.q 125 N. Y. 7, 25 N. E. 1058 (1890); Amory v. Bacharach
Quality Stores, 271 Pa. 364, 117 At. 435 (1921). Contra: General Motors
Acceptance Corp. v. Talbott, 38 Idaho 13, 219 Pac. 1058 (1923). Generally,
however, "partial ousters" are invalid. Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 20 WalL
445 (U. S. 1374). (agreement not to sue in federal courts) ; Sudbury v. Ambi
etc., 213 App. Div. 98, 210 N. Y. Supp. 164 (1st Dep't 1925) (agreement to
sue only in the courts of Germany); 2 PAGE, CONTRAcTs (2d ed. 1920) §
720; Note (1925) 25 CoL. L. REv. 1063; (1926) 35 YATZ L. T. 503.
33,Cf. Pecararo v. Grover, 5 La. App. 676 (1927) (leak in roof); Com-
mercial Union Assurance Co. v. Foley Bros., 141 Minn. 258, 169 N. W.
793 (1918) (loss by water or fire); Lerner v. Heickden, 89 Pa. Super. CL
234 (1926) ("loss of property however occurring").
a4 Cf. Santa Fe R. R. v. Grant Bros., 228 U. S. 177, 33 Sup. Cb. 474
(1913).
as In re Garcelon's Estate, 104 Cal. 570, 38 Pac. 414 (1894).; Sellers v.
Perry, 191 Mich. 619, .158 X. W. 144 (1916); of. Conklin v. Conklin, 165
Mich. 571, 131 N. W. 154 (1911) (agreement fraudulent).
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being inclusive of particular protected defenses, as a matter of
logic would also be invalid. The question frequently arises in
insurance policies. Where the insurance company inserts a
provision that the policy will be incontestable from date, there is
actually an agreement not to defend the policy on any account,
and the clause is declared invalid.30  But policies incontestable
after the lapse of a certain time from the date of execution are
sustainable.37 Perhaps the most effective stibulation is an agree-
ment not to set up any defense except fraud. Such a provision
has been sustained in Kentucky in the case of In~si.once Co. V.
Rider.P8
There is no reason, however, for declaring an agreement to
waive all defenses invalid until the defendant raises a defense
that is protected by the courts.-3 This would give effect to the
contract as long as it did not infringe upon the judicial inter-
30Welch v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co.; Reagan v. Union Mut. Life Ins.
Co., both supra note 9.
3 Insurance Co. v. Snavely, 206 Fed. 20 (C. C. A. 9th, 1918) ; Ramsay v.
Insurance Co., 297 Ill. 592, 131 N. E. 108 (1921); Chinery v. Insurance
Co., 112 Misc. 107, 182 N. Y. Supp. 555 (App. Div. 2d Dep'b 1920); of.
People v. Alexander, 183 App. Div. 868, 171 N. Y. Supp. 881 (1st Dep't 1918)
(clause does not prevent a criminal prosecution for larceny). But of.
Fay & Egan v. Independent Lumber Co., 178 Ala. 166, 59 So. 470 (1912)
(agreement in a bill of sale not to set up fraud after a "reasonable time"
held not to preclude vendee from showing fraud in the inducement). It
should be noted that besides operating as a waiver of all defenses after
the lapse of a certain time, these incontestable clauses also operate to
limit the period within which the insurer can bring an action seeking
cancellation of the policy. Such agreements to shorten the statutory period
of limitations are generally sustained. See supra note 27.
3s 150 K. 505, 150 S. W. 649 (1912).
39 Cf. Anglo-California Trust Co. v. Hall, supra note 8. In this case a
conditional vendee agreed that in the event his vendor assigned his claim
to a third party he would thereafter be precluded from attacking the
validity of the sale agreement on any ground. Although a statute speelf-
ically provided that all assignments of choses in action should be without
prejudice to any set-off or other defense, the court held that by his agree-
ment the vendee was precluded from setting up a breach of warranty.
But the court specifically stated that this would not prevent the defenses
of "fraud, duress, or something against public policy."
The cases involving all-inclusive no-defense provisions and holding them
invalid have involved attempts to set up defenses ordinarily considered
protected by public policy; they give no basis for assuming that such
general clauses would not preclude defenses which would be precluded by
a specific agreement with respect to them. In re Lawrence, 166 Fed. 239
(C. C. A. 2d, 1908) (illegality of consideration); J. B. Colt Co. v. Koehn,
128 Okla. 39, 260 Pac. 1060 (1927); cf. Osborne v. McQueen, 67 Wis. 392,
29 N. W. 636 (1886) (a waiver of all defenses held not to prevent counter-
claim for breach of warranty; the reason given was that warranty agree-
ment was distinct and separate and the waiver provision was hence not
applicable) ; Reisler v. Dempsey, 173 N. Y. Supp. 212 (Sup. Ct. 1918) (an
agreement not to defend an injunction is not void where public policy or
the interests of third parties are mot involved).
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pretation of public policy, thus prohibiting a waivable defense
such as the statute of limitations but allowing the defense of
fraud.
RETROACTIVE ZONING ORDINANCES
Property restriction by means of zoning being still in its
formative stage,1 its limitations are as yet undefined.2  The
problem is practically confined to use regulation,3 which may be
subdivided into two phases--the prohibition of future non-con-
forming uses and the discontinuance of existing ones. It is the
latter which at present causes the greater difficulty.4
M~any state enabling acts 5 specifically provide that existing
uses shall be exempt from the operation of zoning ordinances, or
at least that their elimination shall be effected gradually.( Thus,
the customary method of eliminating non-conforming existing
uses is to forbid any alterations or rebuilding,7 and once those
ISee Windsor v. Whitney, 95 Conn. 357, 368, 111 Atl. 354, 357 (1920).
2 Freund, Some Problems in the Law of Zonin, (1929) 24 ILL. L. 1REV.
135; of. State of Washington v. Roberge, 49 Sup. Ct. 50, 51 (U. S. 1929).
3 Other types of restrictions are generally upheld. Welch v. Swasey,
214 U. S. 91, 29 Sup. Ct. 567 (1909) (height); Wulfsolm v. Burden, 241
N. Y. 288, 150 N. E. 120 (1925) (area); People v. Clark, 216 App. Div.
351, 215 N. Y. Supp. 190 (1st Dep't 1926) (bulk); Bassett, Constitutional-
ity of Zoning (1924) 13 NAT. Mug'. REv. 4923; Young, City Planning anZ
Restiictions (1925) 9 IINN. L. BRv. 518, 593.
The constitutionality of a comprehensive zoning plan embodying a class-
ification of structures according to use has been upheld by the United
States Supreme Court. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S.
365, 47 Sup. Ct. 114 (1927). Most of the state courts have taken a similar
view on the general principle of building restrictions on the basis of use.
Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams, 229 N. Y. 313, 128 N. E. 209 (1920); In
re Opinion of the Justices, 234 Mass. 597, 127 N. E. 525 (1920); State
v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 196 N. W. 451 (1923) ; City of Aurora v. Burns,
319 Ill. 84, 149 N. E; 784 (1925). Contra: Ignaciunas v. Town of Nutley,
99 N. J. L. 389, 125 Ati 121 (1924).; Goldman v. Crowther, 147 Md. 282,
128 AtI. 50 (1925); Spann v. City of Dallas, 111 Tex. 350, 235 S. W. 513
(1921). But of. City of Wichita Falls v. Continental Oil Co., 117 Te.i
256, 5 S. W. (2d) 561 (1928).
4 BA=E LEGAL ASPEcTs OF ZONING (1927) 144.
5 The general rule is that there must be a state enabling act before munic-
ipalities therein may adopt zoning ordinances. Dawley v. Collingwood,
218 N. W. 766 (Mich. 1928); see Clements v. McCabe, 210 Mich. 207, 210,
177 N. W. 722, 726 (1920).
6 ILL. Rv. STAT. (Cahill, 1927) c. 24, par. 521; KAN. REV. STAT. AMT.
(1923) c. 13, art. 2; MASS. GEN. L Ws (1921) c. 40, § 29; I- H. VUB-.
LAws (1926) c. 92, § 3; OMo GEN. COD- (Page, 1926) § 4366-9; Wis.
STAT. (1927) § 62.23.
7People v. Leo, 193' App. Div. 910, 185 N. Y. Supp. 948 (1st Dep't 1920)
(alterations amounting to over 50% of building's value prohibited); State
v. Hillnan, 147 AtL. 294 (Conn. 1929) (same facts); Ward's Appeal, 289
Pa. 458, 137 AtL 630 (1927) (old building ordered razed but new structure
for similar use forbidden).; City of Earle v. Shackleford, 177 Ark. 291, 6
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uses have been discontinued or destroyed, a duty arises to ab-
stain thereafter from non-conformity.8 The validity of these.
provisions is generally recognized and the few decisions disap-
proving of their application can be attributed to the unusual cir-.
cumstances involved.9 In some situations zoning ordinances.
may be so construed as to give them retroactive operation. This.
question of construction always arises in connection with build-.
ings in the process ot erection When the ordinances are passed,.
and it is usually held that the ordinances are without iorce or-
effect as to structures of that classY' But when municipalities
attempt to revoke building permits issued before the enactment.
of a zoning ordinance, the courts will sustain the revocation pro-
vided there has been no "material" action in reliance on the.
permit. 11 Generally it is only to this extent that the courts have,
so far permitted zoning ordinances to operate retroactively.
In 1927 the city of New Orleans passed a zoning ordinance.
prohibiting the establishment of any business within a certain,
district, designated as residential, and requiring all businesses
in operation at the time of its enactment to liquidate or remove
within one'year I2 The owners of two stores, the only property-
affected by the retroactive clauses of the ordinance, appealed to.
S. W. (2d) 294 (1928) (blacksmith shop not permitted to be converted,
into a filling station); Matter of De Fine v. Board of Health, 217 App.
Div. 753, 216 N. Y. Supp. 821 (1st Dep't 1925) (owner forbidden to chango.
garage into poultry slaughtering establishment).8 Wilson v. Edgar, 64 Cal. App. 654, 222 Pac. 623 (1923).; Collins v.
Moore, 125 Misc. 777, 211 N. Y. Supp. 434 (Sup. Ct. 1925) ; Van Horn v.
City of New Orleans, 161 La. 767, 109 So. 484 (1926);; Freund, op. Cie.
supra note 2, at 138.
9 Bartkus v. Albers, 189 Wis. 539, 208 N. W. 260 (1926) (addition to.
store permitted, addition being for residential purposes); Liberty Lure-,
ber Co. v. City of Tacoma, 142 Wash. 377, 253 Pac. 122 (1927) (erection
of two additional structures by existing business held not the "establish-
ment" of a business as forbidden by the ordinance); Appeal of Hailer
Baking Co., 295 Pa. 257, 145 At]. 77 (1928) (stable used only occasionally-
for team of horses held not to be "discontinued" in sense it must there-
after conform to ordinance).
I' 1 Building Height Cases, 18Z Wis. 519, 195 N. W. 544 (1923); Pelham
View Apartment v. Switzer, 130 Misc. 545, 224 N. Y. Supp. 56 (Sup. Ct.
1927); Rosenberg v. Village of Whitefish Bay, 225 N. W. 838 (Wis. 1020):;
City of New Britain v. Kilbourne, 147 Atl. 124 (Conn. 1929); Freeman v.
Hague, 147 At. 553 (N. J. 1929). Contra: Ware v. City of Wichita, 113
Kan. 153, 214 Pac. 99 (1923) (erection of building begun before ordinance.
was adopted enjoined after it went into effect).21 People v. Kleinert, 237 N. Y. 80, 143 N. EJ 750 (1924) (construction
not started); Brett v. Building Comm'r, 250 Mass. 73, 145 N. B. 269 (1924)
(only excavations had been dug); State v. Christopher, 317 MIo. 1179, 298.
S. W. 720 (1927) (construction not started),. But of. Carlton Court v.
Switzer, 221 App. Div. 799, 223 N. Y. Supp. 856 (1st Dep't 1927) (con--
struction had started).
a2 Ordinance No. 9651.
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the courts.?3 In both cases, the Supreme Court of Louisiana up-
held the ordinance. While no other court has been found which
has passed directly upon the question there involved,'* there are
considerable dicta to the effect that retroactive ordinances are
invalid,"' and zoning and city-planning authorities unanimously
advise against them. 5 The purpose of zoning, which is said to
be the crystallization of present conditions and the constructive
control of future development, 7 does not require that existing
uses be changed. Hence it has been generally assumed that any
attempt to make zoning ordinances retroactive would meet with
the opposition of the courts and might result in their declaring
the ordinances as a whole unconstitutional.
One aspect of the problem is brought out in the Louisiana
court's attempt to justify the retroactive operation of the ordi-
nance on the ground that the use of land for a store in the re-
stricted district was a nuisance. It is a common occurrence,
where there are zoning ordinances in effect, for the exclusions
to begin with nuisances and near-nuisances, over which munic-
ipalities have always had extensive control' 8 The first zoning
13 State v. MacDonald, 121 So. 613 (La. 1929)1; State v. Jacoby, 123 So.
314 (La. 1929).
'14 See Tooke, .Judia Decisions (1929) 18 NAT. MUN. REV. 492.
'-See City, of Aurora v. Burns, supra note 3, at 96, 149 X. E. at 789;
Blumenthal v. Cryer, 71 Cal. App. 668, 670, 236 Pac. 216, 217 (1925);
Adams v. Kalamazoo, Ice Co., 222 N. W. 86, 87 (Mich. 1928); Durldn
Lumber Co. v. Fitzsimmons, 147 At!. 555, 558 (N. J. 1929).
l 5Bassett, Zoning (1920) 9 NAT. M UN. REv. 315, 330; Chamberlain and
Pierson, Constitztionality of Zoning (1924) 10 A. B. A. . 1S5; Bettman,
Constitutionality -of Zoning (1924) 37 HARv. L. RIV. 834; Young, op. cit.
supra note 3, at 626; Byrne, Constitutionality of a General Zoning Ordi-
nance (1927) 11 ?iARQU=r L. REV. 189; BAHM, op. cit. -Upra note
4, at 145.
It -was at one time suggested that the exemption of existing uses from
the operation of the zoning ordinances -would be unlawfully discriminatory.
See People v. Kaul, 302 Ill. 317, 323, 134 N. E. 740, 742 (1922). But it is
now recognized that such discrimination is not only reasonable but neces-
sary. See City of Aurora v. Burns, supra note 3, at 97, 149 N. E. at 789;
Lincoln Trust v. Williams, supra note 3, at 318, 128 N. E. at 210; State v.
Harrison, 164 La. 564, 570 114 So. 159, 161 (1927); Sampere v. City of
New Orleans, 166 La. '76, 779, 117 So. 827, 828 (1928); Spencer-Sturla
Co. v. Memphis, 155 Tenn. 70, 88, 290 S. W. 608, 614 (1926).
17 See BArnM, op. cit supra note 4, at 144; Bassett, op. cit. supra note
16, at 321.
Is See Young, op. cit. supra note 3, at 595. The question of just what con-
stitutes a nuisance in this connection is beyond the scope of this paper.
For further discussion, see Young, op. cit. supra, note 3, at 612; Bettman,
op. cit. supra note 16, at 836 et seq.
In State v. Jacoby, supra note 13, at 317, it is suggested that the removal
of the drug store is also justifiable as it constitutes a fire hazard due to
"the inflammable tendency of so much of its contents." In the establish-
ment of fire districts-another forerunner of the more recent zoning de-
velopment-where the constructioi of wooden buildings is prohibited, the
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ordinances held valid amounted in fact to little more than.
nuisance regulations."0 The law -of nuisances, however; was in-
adequate to take care of all the exigencies that arose in zoning-
development and the courts were driven to such an elasticity of'
definition of the uses that could be declared nuisances that the.
term lost all meaning as a practical measure of legislative.
power.20
This background of nuisance law in the development of zoning
occasionally leads to erroneous results. Property regulation by
means of zoning is not restricted to what is disorderly or of-,
fensive. The so-called "nuisance concept" of zoning is respon-
sible not only for an unjustified reduction of the scope of zoning-
but also for unsound distinctions, such as the one which results
in excluding factories from residential districts as nuisances
ordinances generally operate prospectively, but retroactive regulations.
have occasionally been upheld. Hine v. City of New Haven, 40 Conn. 478.
(1873); Houlton v. Titcomb, 130 Ind. 149, 28 N. E. 849 (1906); Greenough
v. Allen Theatre and Realty Co., 33 R. I. 120, 80 AtI. 260 (1911) ; of. City-
of Marysville v. Standard Oil Co., 27 F. (2d) 478 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928).
10 Comment (1923) 82 Y.4LE L. J. 833; Byrne, op. cit. supra note 16,.
at 197.
This development began with the courts sanctioning the removal of a.
business the operation of which was clearly a public nuisance in the com-
munity where it was situated. Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S.
659 (1878).; Crowley v. Christenson, 137 U. S. 86, 11 Sup. Ct. 13 (1890).
The power of municipalities gradually extended from this to prohibiting-
in residential districts industries and certain other uses of property which,
'although not nuisances per" so, were equally objectionable in some locations.
E>d parte Quong Wo, 161 Cal. 220, 118 Fac. 714 (1911) (laundry); Rein-
man v. City of Little Rock, 237 U. S. 171, 35 Sup. Ct. 511 (1914) (livery,
stable) ; Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U. S. 394, 36 Sup. Ct. 143 (1917)
(brick yard). The last case involved an extreme example of hardship to
the individual, causing a loss of $800,000 in the value of the property.
The result was justified as an exercise of the police power which the Court.
characterized as "one of the most essential powers of government and ono
that is the least limitable." In itu opinion the Court did not base. its
decision squarely on the fact that the forbidden use of the property was
a nuisance. As a result some courts have been misled as to what the case.
actually holds. See City of Marysville v. Standard Oil Co., Supra note 18,
at 484.
The exclusion of some types of businesses, such as funeral establish-
ments, from residential sections is invariably placed on the ground of'
nuisance, in spite of the- fact that there are zoning ordinances prohibiting-
such business in force. Brown v. City of Los Angeles, 183 Cal. 78, 192.
Pac. 716 (1920); Cunningham v. Miller, 178 Wis. 22, 189 N. W. 531 (1922);
Spencer-Starla Co. v. Memphis, supra note 16; Ex parte Ruppe, 80 Cal..
App. 629, 252 Pac. 746 (1927); City of Tucson v. Arizona Mortuary Co.,
272 Pac. 923 (Axiz. 1928).
*20 Cf. City of Syracuse v. Snow, 123 Misc. 568, 205 N. Y. Supp. 785 (lst
Dep't 1924) (sorority house prohibited as a nuisance); City of Now
Orleans v. Liberty Dress Shop, 157 La. 26, 101 So. 798 (1924) (ladies'"
wearing apparel shop enjoined as a nuisance).
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while allowing stores and apartment houses to remain as non-
nuisances.21 Furthermore, in attempting to apply to all types
-of zoning ordinances the summary methods of prevention and
suppression which are employed in the case of nuisances, munic-
ipalities obviously fail to take into account the fact that zoning
not only includes but also supplements nuisance regulation. A
restriction imposed to prohibit an offensive use is not a taking of
property for which compensation must be made 2 and in the
abatement of nuisances retroactive measures are validP Grant-
ing that a zoning ordinance may operate retroactively where
-there is clearly an element of nuisance, it does not follow that a
-similar disposition may be made of every type of non-conforming
use dealt with in zbning.2-4 Use of land for a general store or drug
-store, as in the Louisiana cases, hardly corresponds with ordi-
nary concepts of nuisance. The enforcement of a retroactive
Tegalation where the uses of land affected can scarcely be called
nuisances should not be sustained simply because the regulation
is incorporated in a zoning ordinance. -25
The serious deprivation of valuable interests in existing physi-
cal property which is accomplished by th-e New Orleans ordi-
-nance presents a question as to the validity of retroactive zoning
regulations. The fact that a restriction results in some financial
loss does not thereby exempt the property from its operatio -
Yet while courts profess to disregard value alone as a standard
in determaining whether or not a zoning ordinance is reasonable,
they generally hold unreasonable what may seem to be a lawful
regulation when it causes an unusually large or total deprivation
-of the beneficial use of property.27 In an analogous situation in
21- State v. Houghton, 134 Minn. 226, 158 N. W. 1017 (1916); Welch v.
-City of Niagara Falls, 210 App. Div. 170, 205 N. Y. Supp. 454 (4th Dep't
1924)'; Wergin v. Voss, 179 Wis. 603, 192 N. W. 51 (1923). Where this
muisance theory of segregation is followed, the benefits of zoning to indus-
try are said to be dubious. McLaurin, Wltre Zoning Fails (1928) 17 NAT.
M3um. REv. 257.
22See California Reduction Works v. Reduction. Co., 199 U. S. 306, 324,
26 Sup. Ct. 100, 105 (1905).
23See Brown v. Grant, 2 S. W. (2d) 285, 287 (Ten. 1928).
24 "Zoning is not a panacea and cannot be stretched to cover the entire
ield of private restrictions." Bassett, op. cit. supra. note 3, at 498; cf. Van
Hecke, Zoning Ordiwnces and Restrictios'sin Deeds (1928) 37 YALE L. 3.
407, 425.
25 See Dobbins v. City of Los Angeles, 195 U. S. 223, 236, 25 Sup. Ct.
18, 20 (1904).
20 See Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 274 U. S. 325, 327, 47 Sup. CL
594, 595 (1927); Spector v. Building Inspector, 250 Mass. 63, 145 N. E.
265, 267 (1924); People v. Clark, supra note 3, at 360, 215 N. Y. Supp. at
198; Swan, The Law of Zoning (1921) 10 NAT. MUN. Rnr. 519.2 7 Neetow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U. S. 183, 48 Sup. Ct. 447 (1928);
Village of Terrace Park v. Errett, 12 F. (2d) 240 (C. C. JA. 6th, 1926);
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building-line restriction," another court has recently decided
that the attempted regulation went too far.0 In that case, an
ordinance established a set-back line the enforcement of which
would have reduced the complainants' property to a depth of only
two and one-half feet. This was held to be a taking in the con-
stitutional sense, entitling the owner to compensation, and there-
fore invalid. It is difficult to distinguish the hardship in such
an instance from that caused by a retroactive zoning ordinance
which deprives an owner of the use to which his property is law-
fully devoted when the ordinance becomes effective.
In holding ordinances invalid because of the extent of the
diminution in value caused by their application, the courts speak
of the operation of the ordinance as impairing the property
owner's vested rights 30 or as constituting a taking which would
require compensation., The legal theories of vested rights have
little significance in this connection,2 but to decide the question
of the validity of a zoning ordinance on the basis of whether,
there is a "taking" requiring compensation is to confuse the
issues involved.83 Zoning is generally assumed to be an exercise
Sundlun v. Zoning Board of Review, 145 AtI. 451 (R. I. 1929); Heffernan
v. Zoning Board of Review, 144 Atl. 674 (R. I. 1929).
2 8 In an early case, an ordinance requiring owners of abutting property
to conform to established set-back lines was held invalid, the chief issue,
however, being over the validity of a frontage consent provision. Eubank
v. City of Richmond, 226 U. S. 137, 33 Sup. Ct. 76 (1912). But in later
cases, where that issue was not involved, such ordinances have been upheld
and compensation has been held unnecessary. In re Philadelphia Park-
way, 250 Pa. 257, 95 AtI. 429 (1915); Windsor v. Whitney, supra note 11;
State v. Houghton, 171 Minn, 231, 213 N. W. 907 (1927); Gorieb v. Fox,
274 U. S. 603, 47 Sup. Ct. 675 (1927); Sundeen v. Rogers, 141 Atl. 142
(N. H. 1928).
29 In re Sansom Street, 293 Pa. 483, 143 At. 134 (1928) ; (1928) 88 YArm
L. J. 678.
3OSee People v. Stanton, 125 Misc. 215, 216, 211 N. Y. Supp. 488 (Sup.
Ct. 1925) ; Pelham View Apartment v. Switzer, suprm note 10, at 546, 2Z4
N. Y. Supp: at 58; Matter of Bregman, 223 App. Div. 756, 227 X. Y.
Supp. 776 (1st Dept 1928); Brett v. Building Comm., suprn note 11,
at 79, 145 N. E. at 271; Durkin Lumber Co. v. Fitzsimmons, supra note 15,
at 557.
3*See Penn Coal Co. v. Mahon,,260 U. S. 393, 413,43 Sup. Ct. 158, 159
(1922):
= Comment (1925) 34 YALE.L. J. 303; (1928) 41 HAU. L. Rsv. 667; of.
City of Clinton v. Donnelly, 203 Iowa 576, 578, 213 IT. W. 262, 263 (1927).
33 The problem of when zoning regulation may result in what the courts
hold to amount to a taking of private property for -hich compensation
should be made is mot confined to retroactive ordinances. It may arise
where cities attempt to restrict the future development of certain existing
uses with which the land may have become impressed. In re Gilfillan's
Permit, 291 Pa. 358, 140 Atl. 136 (1927) (where business had been con-
ducted on present site for seven years, refusal to allow it to rebuild its
structures not sustained); Western Theological Seminary v. City of
Evanston, 331 IMI. 257, 162 N. E. 863 (1928) (city not allowed to forbid
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-of the police power,34 and the only noteworthy effort to accomx-
plish similar results by means of the power of eminent domain
has demonstrated that where compensation is required zoning
is impractical.- By attempting to accomplish through zoning
measures results which are upheld only if done under eminent
.domain36 and for which compensation is therefore given, munic-
ipalities are overlooking a distinction = that has proved itself
-essential in the development of zoning.
Two general propositions may be advanced, which, although
they will not ultimately settle the question, may serve as guides
-to deterining the probable validity or invalidity of zoning ordi-
nances. Such ordinances should not embody restrictions which
.bear no relation to the real purpose of zoning;:13 and their appli-
,cation should not result in rendering a land owner unable to make
erection of college dormitory). But of. American Wood Products Co. v.
City of Minneapolis, 21 F. (2d) 440 (D.'C. 1927), aff'd, 35 F. (2d) 657 (C.
C. A. 8th, 1929) (long-established business not allowed to expand on its
own laud).
3
- Freund, op. cit. su a note 2, at 139; Anderson, Zoning in. Minnwzota--
Eminent Domain -o. Police Power (1927) 16 NAT. MuN. RV. 624; HuBBAun,
OUR CnmS TODAY AND ToioRRow (1929) 23, 162.
-In Minnesota zoning was at first basid on the power of eminent
domain. Minn. Laws 1915, c. 128; State v. Houghton, 144 Minn- 1, 176
N. W. 159 (1920). This did not prove successful and in 1921 another
enabling act basing zoning on the police power was passed and later upheld
by the courts. Alinn. Laws 1921, c. 217; State v. Houghton, 164 Minn. 146,
204 N. W. 569 (1924) ; Anderson, op. cit. supra note 34.
3 See American Wood Products Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 'upra note
33, at 444.
37
'For discussions of the distinction between the police power and the
power of eminent domain, see FREUND, PoLicE Powrn (1904) § 511; Com.-
ment (1920). 30 YAT L. J. 171; Comment (1923) 32 YATm L. J. 833.
B8 See upra note 17, and text. An example of restrictions having no
relation to this purpose is the practice, commonly called "dumping," of pro-
liiting within the limits of a municipality the uses which the community
needs but -which it would prefer to have inflicted on some other community,
e. g., certain types of eleemosynary institutions. The courts have held-
invalid practically every effort of this sort that has come before them.
Mineola Home for Cardiac Children v. Village of Irvington, N. Y. Sup. Ct.
Westchester County (1925) (not reported); City of Wilmington v. Turk, 14
Del. Ch. 392, 129 Atl. 512 (1925) (maternity hospital); Shacldeford v.
Board of Adjustment, Colo. Dist. Ct. (1925) (not reported) (extension
of a tuberculosis hospital); Jardine v. City of Pasadena, 199 Cal. 64, 248
Pac, 225 (1925) (hospital for infectious diseases); University Heights v.
Cleveland Jewish Orphans' Home, 20 F. (2d). 743 (C. C. A. 6th, 1927),
aff'd without opinion, 275 U. S. 569, 48 Sup. Ct. 141 (1927).; Law v. City of
Spartanburg, 148 S. C. 249, 146 S. E. 12 (1928) (tuberculosis hospital);
State of Washington v. Roberge, supra note 2 (veterans' hospital); Note
(1927) 21 ILL. L. REv. 284. But cf. Jewish Consumptives Relief Society
v. Town of Woodbury, N. Y. Sup. Ct. Orange County (1929) (not
reported).
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any practical use of his property.9 A failure by a municipality
to take these considerations into account in framing and enforc-
ing an ordinance might well justify a court in holding such an
ordinance invalid as being "an interference with private rights
upon the claim of a promotion of what is vaguely termed the
general welfare." 40
s9 Nectow v. City of Cambridge, supra note 27. See Chamberlain, Zoning
P 'ogress (1929) 15 A. B. A. 3. 535, 537.
0. See City of Providence v. Stephens, 47 R. I. 387, 391, 133 Atl. 614, 616
(1926).
